What Drives Gender Gaps in Preferences for Redistribution? New Evidence from the European Social Survey

Monica Bozzano* Simona Scabrosetti†

July 29, 2025

Abstract

We investigate the gender gaps in preferences for redistribution using data from the European Social Survey (ESS) over the period spanning from 2002 to 2022. We integrate individual-level socio-economic and demographic characteristics, attitudinal factors, and macro-level influences. Our findings confirm significant differences among genders, with women generally expressing stronger preferences for redistribution than men. However, we uncover the multidimensionality of these gaps. Through a Gelbach decomposition analysis, our study identifies differences in beliefs and attitudes, especially egalitarian values and political ideology, as primary drivers of the observed gaps. Additionally, we document that not all women are more redistributive than men. The gender gaps, indeed, are neither uniform across age cohorts nor along different country-level conditions. Overall, the adult gender gap is the most pronounced, even if this evidence varies along macroeconomic contexts, across welfare regimes, and over time. Our findings underscore the complexity of redistributive preferences, representing a challenge for future policy design from a gender-sensitive perspective.

Keywords: preferences for redistribution, gender gaps, self-interest, attitudes and beliefs, contextual factors, cohort differences, welfare regimes

JEL classification: H00, J1, P50

*Mercatorum University, Rome, Italy, and GLO, Germany. Email: monica.bozzano@unimercatorum.it

†University of Pavia, and Carlo F. Dondena Centre for Research on Social Dynamics and Public Policies, Bocconi University, Italy. Email: simona.scabrosetti@unipv.it

"Men are from Mars and Women from Venus."

– Gray, 1990

1 Introduction

Women are consistently found to support stronger preferences towards redistribution compared to men - one of the most robust and clear-cut stylized facts on preferences for redistribution conveyed by recent economic literature (Alesina and Giuliano 2011, Alesina and La Ferrara 2005, Kourtellos and Petrou 2022, Shapiro and Mahajan 1986, Guillaud 2013, Luttmer and Singhal 2011, Roth and Wohlfart 2018).[1] This gendered pattern in redistributive preferences aligns with broader evidence which has documented that women and men definitely exhibit distinct preferences and attitudes in various dimensions, such as risk aversion, competitiveness, and altruism, among others. These findings, comprehensively reviewed by Bertrand (2011), Croson and Gneezy (2009), and Olivetti and Petrongolo (2016), are closely associated with divergent labour market outcomes and broader economic and political behaviors.

Nevertheless, key questions remain unresolved. Do all women and all men drift apart in their redistributive preferences, or do these differences vary by subgroups or across contexts? And more: Is this divergence a recent phenomenon, or does it reflect and hide enduring and differentiated patterns?

This paper investigates the heterogeneity of redistributive preferences across genders among European citizens. It explores whether differences in preferences are influenced by factors such as socio-economic and demographic characteristics, attitudinal factors, and country-level contextual conditions. Understanding the origins and variation of citizens' preferences is crucial for policymakers, as these preferences shape voting behavior and influence political representation. Ultimately, the design of policies targeting different demographic groups and their priorities might have far-reaching implications for the shaping of political and party platforms, and thus for welfare and economic systems.

We perform an empirical investigation as follows. At the individual level, women might differ from men in two ways. First, the two groups might be characterized and differ on some relevant attributes or conditions, such as systematic differences in income, occupational status, or political ideology, determining compositional effects. Second, attributes or characteristics might differently influence women and men's payoffs and preferences, namely conditional effects. Therefore, in the first

[1] Although this evidence is widely acknowledged, Assandri *et al.* (2008) and Beraldo *et al.* (2022)'s laboratory experiments point out the opposite finding. For a complete review of the literature on gender gaps in preferences for redistribution, refer to Bozzano and Scabrosetti (2024).

part of the analysis, we evaluate the contribution to explaining preferences for redistribution of a series of individual characteristics and their interaction with gender. A Gelbach decomposition framework is also adopted to describe which channel is entitled to produce the observed gap. Then, in the second part of the analysis, we claim that women might also be differentially affected by the institutional and contextual framework, such as the level of economic development and/or the cultural background. As a result, we factor into the model a set of macro-level variables, both singularly and interacted with gender. We also include a cohort decomposition of these effects. Finally, we provide a dynamic analysis of gender gaps over the past two decades, again also disaggregated by age cohort.

We make several contributions to the existing literature on gender differences in redistributive preferences. First, we explicitly focus on gaps in redistributive preferences rather than levels, trying to discern the underlying sources of these differences. In particular, our analysis aims to investigate, within a comprehensive framework, different mechanisms that the literature has examined in isolation. Second, although extensive, the existing research lacks a deeper understanding of the heterogeneity of pro-redistribution preferences both *across* and *within* genders, as highlighted by Bozzano and Scabrosetti (2024). Indeed, the gender dimension is overly treated as a mere control variable. To address this limitation, we explicitly allow the impact of individual and contextual variables to vary by gender, also including both cohort and time effects. Third, we apply a Gelbach decomposition technique to female-male differences, a widely used approach to explain gender wage gaps but, to the best of our knowledge, never adopted to examine the gender gap in redistributive preferences.

Drawing on data from the European Social Survey (ESS) in the period from 2002 to 2022, our results confirm a large gap in preferences for redistribution between women and men after controlling for different socio-economic and demographic factors as well as individual beliefs and attitudes. Gender gaps are widest among respondents living in more affluent households, those with tertiary education, divorced individuals, politically right-leaning respondents, and those with lower levels of religiosity. Moreover, women holding stronger beliefs in fairness and greater trust in both politicians and the national government are consistently more redistributive than their male counterparts, widening the gender gap in redistributive preferences. Conversely, the strength of respondents' egalitarian beliefs is associated with a narrowing of the gender gap. Along all these potential drivers of the observed gap in redistributive preferences, our decomposition results clearly indicate income, on the one hand, and beliefs and attitudes, especially political ideology and egalitarian values, on the other, as key determinants in our sample. However, since we acknowledge that most of the gap between men and

women remains unexplained, a second set of results arises. Including macro-level contextual variables, we find that the higher the level of per capita GNI and country's gender equality, the higher the gender gap in preferences for redistribution. In contrast, for higher levels of country's income inequality and religiosity, women and men are more similar in their demand for increased redistribution. Across different welfare systems, the gender gap is the widest for Social Democratic countries, whereas for the Mediterranean regimes is the smallest. When accounting for age effects, we consistently find the adult gender gap to be the most pronounced across almost all specifications and samples. Finally, on aggregate, we observe a converging and decreasing trend of the gender gap over time. Still, young women and men drift apart in the last periods under analysis, whereas the adult gender gap remains consistently wide throughout.

The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: in Section 2 we recall the most relevant research on redistributive preferences and the potential sources of gender differences. Section 3 describes our data and key variables. Section 4 presents our empirical strategy and results. First, it documents gender gaps according to individual-level characteristics and presents the results of the Gelbach decomposition. Then, it illustrates the intersection between gender and macro-level variables and welfare regimes, also considering age cohorts and the dynamics of the gender gaps over time. Section 5 concludes.

2 Potential motives of gender-specific preferences for redistribution: a selected literature review

Our understanding of the process of preference formation has dramatically improved over the last decades: previous research now offers many-fold accounts of the factors that promote and explain individuals' preferences for redistribution, as well as the mechanisms at work in which females and males might differ. Our purpose is to select a set of these competing processes for redistributive preferences formation, explicitly test them accordingly in a more comprehensive empirical framework, and evaluate the explanatory power of such mechanisms at stake in determining gender gaps.

Conceptually, the process of forming preferences for redistribution is a complex one.[2]

On one side, individuals internally elaborate information on their own socio-economic conditions and evaluate the potential payoffs they might receive as beneficiaries of redistributive policies. This is

[2]Fazio (2024) provides a review of the literature on the determinants of preferences for redistribution specifically focusing, among others, on the roles of trust, fairness, other-regarding individual characteristics as well as economic or natural shocks. Refer to Mengel and Weidenholzer (2022) for an extensive survey of the literature on the determinants of preferences for redistribution.

generally referred as to the "neoclassical" or self-interest motivation.[3] Similarly, insurance motivations are also at work and are strictly interrelated to self-interest ones. Thus, gender differences may arise from varying socio-economic and financial conditions and from the need for increased stability, as a safety net for current and/or future well-being. Women generally experience higher levels of economic hardship and vulnerability as compared to men, which may lead to increased support for redistribution due to either higher economic deprivation (Keely and Tan 2008) or greater perceived barriers to social mobility and advancement (e.g., the glass ceiling or the leaky pipeline phenomena). Additionally, women often exhibit higher risk aversion and lower overconfidence and competitiveness (Buser *et al.* 2020, Gärtner *et al.* 2017), traits that shape their economic choices in terms of human capital investment (i.e., see the gender gap in maths and STEM) and job search. Given these considerations, together with the tendency to underestimate their future income prospects, women will rely more on government intervention as an insurance mechanism.[4] This becomes even more relevant if considered that, over the life cycle, women are more likely to face financial set-backs due to career breaks (the so-called "motherhood or child penalty")[5] and/or more likely to work in lower-paid or part-time jobs, and, as a result, end up with lower retirement savings (e.g., Lis and Bonthuis 2020). Hence, "deservingness" in terms of healthcare, family benefits, family-career reconciliation policies, and pensions might be a more relevant predictor for redistributive preferences for women than for men.[6]

On the other side, redistributive preferences are also strongly shaped by personality traits, ethical considerations, and moral values and principles - deeply held beliefs about fairness and egalitarianism or social responsibility - that guide people's perceptions about what should be done for others even if they do not stand to benefit from such policies. This might be considered as the non-policy-

[3] As pioneered by Meltzer and Richards (1981), income and wealth—whether past, current, or future prospects—play a primary role in shaping attitudes toward redistribution (Piketty 1995; Alesina and La Ferrara 2005). Similarly, perceptions of income distribution (Cruces *et al.* 2013), income inequality (Meltzer and Richard 1981; Yamamura 2012; Olivera 2015; Roth and Wohlfart 2018), and social and intergenerational mobility (Piketty 1995; Bénabou and Ok 2001; Alesina *et al.* 2018) influence redistributive preferences.

[4] As early as the 1980, Hal Varian argued: "The motive for redistribution here is not a desire for equity *per se*, but rather a desire for *social insurance*, and cited the Beveridge Report (1942) which claimed that individuals' demand a better distribution of purchasing power "*as between times of earning and not earning, and between times of heavy family responsibilities and light or no family responsibilities.* Both social insurance and children's allowances are primary methods of redistributing wealth."

[5] According to Bertrand (2020), one of the most relevant causes of gender gaps in the labour market is motherhood. Recent estimates confirm that the impact of motherhood on female labour market outcomes is large. See among others Kleven et al (2019), Casarico and Lattanzio (2023), Angelov et al. (2016).

[6] In this respect, the vast literature on the political economy of taxation and the welfare state has documented the impact of women's increased representation in politics and decision-making on public spending choices, particularly in favour of gender-sensitive policies such as health, child support, social protection, education, and welfare. For example, Alvarez and McCaffery (2003) argue that women are more likely to support expanded spending on education and social security, whereas men are more likely to favour tax cut or reductions in national debt. Hessami and Lopes da Fonseca (2020) provide a literature survey on this point.

based demand for redistribution. Thereby, differences among genders in altruism, fairness, and other-regarding beliefs, such as compassion or empathy, might be central in determining gender gaps in preferences for redistribution.[7] Being generally perceived as more compassionate and altruistic, as well as more inclined to support equality, mostly because of gendered socialization and upbringings, women are thus more likely to favour redistribution (Durante *et al.* 2014). In addition, women tend to lean more toward left-wing ideologies in both the U.S. and Europe, which further contributes to a larger gender gap in preferences for redistribution (Inglehart and Norris 2000; Edlund and Pande 2002; Iversen and Rosenbluth 2006; Giger 2009). This phenomenon, known as the "modern gender gap," highlights women's increasing alignment with egalitarian policies over recent decades (Ranehill and Weber 2017).[8]

Beyond these two individual-level channels, people's judgements and elaborations are not made in isolation from the macro-level context. The environment in which each person is inevitably embedded, whether general macroeconomic conditions or the institutional and cultural background, frames and shapes preferences for redistribution. The relationship between macroeconomic conditions, culture, and attitudes toward redistribution is well-documented, including the impact of national socio-economic factors (Jaeger 2013; Andreoli and Olivera 2020; Kambayashi and Lechevalier 2022), experiences of income inequality and other macro-level shocks (Olivera 2014; Fisman *et al.* 2015; Roth and Wohlfart 2018; Bellani *et al.* 2023), cultural values and social norms (Luttmer and Singhal 2011), and religion (Scheve and Stasavage 2006), as well as the impact of different welfare state regimes and degrees of welfare provision (Svalfors 1997, Jæger 2006). We argue, indeed, that a gender gap in redistributive preferences may, in part, also result from a differential impact of these macro-level factors on women and men. For instance, Bozzano *et al.* (2024) find that in countries with a history of gender equality, women are significantly more supportive of redistribution than men, with political equality as a key driver. Moreover, Shorrocks and Grasso (2020) find that in countries with limited welfare provisions, such as the U.S., women express greater support for social spending and redistribution compared to men, while, in settings with expanded welfare provisions, as the U.K., the gender gap narrows, in particular among younger generations.

[7] These characteristics are closely associated with a greater inclination toward redistribution (Gärtner *et al.* 2017, Dimick *et al.* 2016, 2018, Durante *et al.* 2014) as well as stronger beliefs of social and distributive justice (Fong 2001, Alesina and Angeletos 2005, Bénabou and Tirole 2006).

[8] A further mechanism may lie in the interaction between both self-interest and insurance motivations and other-regarding attitudes and values. See Fehr et al. (2024).

3 Data and Descriptive Statistics

In the analysis, we use stacked cross-sectional data from the European Social Survey (ESS), at present the most extensive source of academically driven cross-national survey data regarding preferences and values within the European context, covering a wide array of countries over a very long period from 2002 to 2022 (i.e., 10 rounds conducted every two years). On the whole, we have information on 299,653 individuals, 145,008 men and 154,645 women, distributed among 39 participating countries, although the actual number of countries included in each round does vary.[9]

Table 1 presents summary statistics for the pooled sample as well as disaggregated by gender.[10]

[Table 1 here]

[Figure 1 here]

Dependent variable

Our outcome variable is a measure of preferences for redistribution computed by referring to the question –repeated across all rounds of the ESS and widely used in the extant literature– about whether, according to the respondent, the government should reduce income differences among citizens. We reverse the original scale such that it takes on values from 1 (Disagree strongly) to 5 (Agree strongly). In this way, higher values represent more pro-redistributive attitudes.

As shown in Figure 1, on aggregate, women consistently exhibit higher levels of redistributive preferences compared to men: the raw level of average preferences of women is 3.94, while that of men is about 3.8 (see Table 1). We observe an increasing trend which peaks in 2012-13 and then declines. Overall, the last two decades have witnessed an increase in average preferences for redistribution; however, the raw gender gap remains relatively constant over time.

Independent variables: individual-level characteristics, attitudes, and beliefs

Following the above-mentioned explanations of preferences at the individual level, we briefly describe the selected variables included in the analysis. First, to capture the role of wealth, we include two categorical variables: the household total net income of respondents, ranging between 1 and 12,

[9]Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, Ireland, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom participated to all the 10 rounds; Austria, Czech Republic, and Estonia to 9 rounds; Denmark to 8 rounds; Israel, Lithuania, and Slovakia to 7 rounds; Bulgaria, Cyprus, and Italy to 6 rounds; Greece, Iceland, Russia, and Ukraine to 5 rounds; Croatia and Latvia to 4 rounds; Albania, Luxembourg, Montenegro, Romania, Serbia, and Turkey to 2 rounds; Kosovo and North Macedonia to 1 round.

[10]More details on the definitions and sources of all variables, as well as on methodological issues, can be found in the Appendix. See Bozzano and Scabrosetti (2024) for a series of preliminary stylized facts on preferences for redistribution based on the same data. Their work serves as a baseline descriptive assessment for the present more rigorous econometric investigation.

which provide a quantitative measure of income, and the household's primary income source for each respondent, which instead provide a qualitative information on the type of income.[11] In this respect, since women generally earn less than men, differences in income might be one of the most relevant sources of divergence in preferences for redistribution. Second, we include the level of education, since increased human capital affects future employment and earning prospects. Using information on each respondent's highest level of educational attainment, we create three dummies to categorize individuals as low educated, secondary educated, and highly educated. According to our dataset, women are effectively poorer (5.37) than men (5.85), on average; at the same time, they attain higher levels of tertiary education (27 vs. 25 percent), while are less represented at the secondary level (46 vs. 50 percent). Next, we look at the heterogeneity in preferences for redistribution related to legal marital status and categorize each respondent as single, married, divorced, and widowed. Similarly, we construct a set of 6 dummy variables according to the occupational status (paid work, in education, unemployed, retired, housework, other activities). Both variables could affect the socio-economic and financial risk to which every individual is exposed.[12] Political ideology is another individual attitude that can play a relevant role in differentially orienting preferences for redistribution among both women and men.[13] It is measured by an ordinal variable derived from the respondent's "Placement on left-right scale," ranging from 0 (Left) to 10 (Right). For individual religiosity, we employ an ordinal variable taking on values from 0 to 10 and derived from individual responses to the question: "How religious are you?". The higher the score, the greater the individual's religiosity. Overall, men and women are on average centrist, whereas women are more religious than men (5.07 vs. 4.17). Moreover, we include two indicators that capture the individual's history of unemployment (being unemployed for 12 months or more in the past) and the experience of family instability (having undergone a divorce) to investigate the "misfortune" hypothesis and the role of past negative shocks (among others, see Alesina and Giuliano 2011 and Roth and Wohlfart 2018). Then, to dig deeper into the heterogeneity in preferences for redistribution according to age, we also add respondents' age in years as well as categorize respondents into four age groups: Youth (25 years or younger), Adult (26 to 50 years), Mature Adult (51 to 65 years), and Elderly (66 years or older). Additionally, since a respondent belonging to

[11] Unfortunately, the ESS does not provide specific information on respondents' personal income, but it includes a variable, *hinctnt*, which categorizes households' total net income from all sources into 12 increasing classes. The inclusion of this variable is, however, standard in the related literature employing the same source of data.

[12] See Hess (2000) on marriage as insurance mechanism for consumption. Divorce is considered a shock for household stability and thus for women more than for men, especially when not working.

[13] On the political gender gap, see for example Edlund and Pande (2002).

a specific age cohort in the first ESS round (e.g., a young respondent in 2002) differs significantly from a respondent of the same age cohort in the last ESS round (e.g., a young respondent in 2022), it might be of interest the study of generations which allows us to investigate a different type of heterogeneity compared to age groups. Therefore, we categorize respondents into 5 dummy variables corresponding to the following generational cohorts: Generation Z (born between 1997 and 2012), Millennials (born between 1981 and 1996), Generation X (born between 1965 and 1980), Baby Boomers (born between 1946 and 1964), and the Silent Generation (born between 1928 and 1945).

Then, the literature has highlighted that women and men might be different in specific moral beliefs directly tied to the desired level of redistribution. We, therefore, include two further beliefs which are found to be correlated with preferences for redistribution in the literature: beliefs on the importance of being treated equally, a variable derived from the answers to the following question: "Important that people are treated equally and have equal opportunities" and taking values from 1 (Not like me at all) to 6 (Very much like me); fairness, a variable captured by the answers to the following question: "Do you think that most people would try to take advantage of you if they got the chance, or would they try to be fair?", which take on values from 0 (Most people would try to take advantage of me) to 10 (Most people would try to be fair). According to our summary statistics, women on average result to believe on egalitarianism and fairness more than men.

Finally, since women and men might have different perceptions on the policymakers' effectiveness and trustworthiness in providing redistributive policies, we select two measures of related attitudes: Trust in politicians, derived from answers to the question "How much you personally trust politicians?," that can take on values from 0 (No trust at all) to 10 (Complete trust); and Satisfaction with national government, built on the answers to the question "How satisfied are you with the way the national government is doing its job?," taking on values from 0 (Extremely dissatisfied) to 10 (Extremely satisfied). In these respects, our data highlight that men show both higher levels of trust in politicians and satisfaction with the National government with respect to women.

Independent variables: macro-level characteristics and institutional framework

In addition to the above-mentioned variables at the individual level, it has been observed that preferences for redistribution are highly related to the context in which individuals live. Previous studies have identified several determinants at the country level which are potentially linked to preferences for redistribution. Thus, we complement our dataset with a selected set of macro-level indicators at the country level by year of interview. We include a measure of income inequality, the Gini coefficient

of equalized disposable income, sourced from the ESS Data Portal, ESS Multilevel Data. It ranges from 0 to 100, with higher values indicating greater income inequality. The country's wealth is instead captured by per capita Gross National Income (GNI), measured in thousand dollars. Data are taken from UNDP. Then, we include the gender equality index (GEI), ranging from 0 to 1, and derived from the UNDP's Gender Inequality Index. We reverse the original index such that the higher the score, the greater the level of gender equality within a country along three dimensions, namely health, empowerment, and labour market participation.[14] Finally, for each participating country, we compute an aggregate measure of the country's religiosity by averaging individual responses to the question: "How religious are you?". The resulting variable takes on values from 0 to 10, with higher scores indicating greater aggregate religiosity.

A brief inspection of our summary statistics shows that a high variability across countries and years exists. In terms of Gini index, Slovenia shows the minimum value in 2002 (22), while Bulgaria the maximum in 2021 (40). The richest country is Luxembourg in 2005, while the poorest is Ukraina in 2009. Gender equality reaches the highest score in Switzerland in 2019 (0.98) and the lowest in Turkey in 2005 (0.47). Lastly, Greece is the most religious country in 2003 and Czech Republic is the most secular in 2013 (see Table 1).

As a further point, the size and main characteristics of the welfare system in the respondents' countries may affect both economic and resource opportunities and attitudes of men and women in their process of redistributive preference formation. According to the so called "regime hypothesis", redistributive policies and public welfare attitudes are strictly related at the country level (Jaeger 2006). To investigate this relationship, we distinguish six different welfare systems within Europe, constructing a set of six dummy variables as follows: Social Democratic, Conservative, Liberal, Mediterranean, East European, and Former USSR (see Esping-Andersen 1990, Ferrera 1996, Fenger 2007, Kudrnáč and Petrúšek 2022).[15]

[14] More precisely, the Gender Inequality Index combines the following dimensions and components: the gap between male and female labor force participation rates, the difference between secondary and higher education rates for men and women, female shares in parliament, and maternal mortality ratio and adolescent fertility.

[15] Social democratic countries are Denmark, Finland, Norway, and Sweden; Conservative for Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Switzerland; Liberal countries are Ireland and United Kingdom; Mediterranean countries are Greece, Italy, Portugal, and Spain; East Europe countries are Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania, Slovak Republic, and Slovenia; and finally Former USSR countries are Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. According to our sources, a number of ESS participating countries could not be included in any of the six welfare state categories.

4 Empirical Strategy and Results

4.1 The Gender Gap in Redistributive Preferences and the role of Individual-level Variables

In this section, the above-described determinants of preferences for redistribution, which have been examined individually in prior literature, will be analysed within a more comprehensive empirical framework, akin to the approach by Alesina and Giuliano (2011). This potentially allows us to understand what determines gender differentials in preferences for redistribution and to provide a tentative evaluation of the differential explanatory power of various mechanisms and determinants at stake.

We start by estimating a baseline specification which can be formally outlined as follows:[16]

$$RedPref_{it} = \alpha + \beta_0 \text{Female}_{it} + \beta_1 \text{X}_{it} + \eta_t + \theta_c + \varepsilon_{it} \tag{1}$$

The dependent variable $RedPref_{it}$ measures the preferences for redistribution of respondent i in interview-year t. The key regressor is Female_{it}, an indicator which takes value 1 if respondent i in interview-year t is female, and zero if male. The vector X_{it} includes a series of standard individual socio-economic and demographic characteristics and beliefs as employed by the extant literature to explain demand for redistribution, such as the respondent's age, the highest level of education, household total net income, legal marital status, occupational status, the main source of household income, political ideology, and individual religiosity. These covariates as well as a constant are always included in all specifications of the analysis. We control for interview-year and country fixed effects, respectively η_t and θ_c, in order to capture unobserved general trends over time and country-specific time-invariant characteristics that might bias the estimates. We cluster standard errors at the country level to account for possible correlation of the individual-level residuals within the same country.

The coefficient β_0 represents our measure of the gender gap in preferences for redistribution, that is the difference in the outcome between women and men in each country and interview year. However, the inclusion of this binary variable only captures the difference in outcome between females and males after controlling for other covariates in the regression, failing to account for the heterogeneity between genders in the covariates themselves. Thus, to capture how women differ from their counterparts because of differences in these compositional characteristics and to account for variation by gender in

[16]For simplicity, all regressions are estimated by Pooled OLS with clustered standard errors at the country level, as Alesina and Giuliano (2011) and Luttmer and Singhal (2011). However, we check the robustness of our estimates also re-running the same models accounting for the survey design of the dataset and results are qualitatively unchanged.

their impact, we turn to a fully-fledged interaction model and modify Equation (1) by interacting all the standard controls in X_{it} with the female dummy.

Consequently, we estimate the following specification in which we control for both variation in X_{it} and gender differences in the variation in X_{it}:

$$RedPref_{it} = \alpha + \beta_0 \text{Female}_i + \beta_1 \text{X}_{it} + \beta_2 (\text{Female}_{it} * \text{X}_{it}) + \eta_t + \theta_c + \varepsilon_{it} \quad (2)$$

The results from the baseline regression in Equation (1) are presented in column 1 of Table 2. Women are significantly more favorable to redistribution, as expected, even after controlling for income, education, marital status, occupational status, political ideology, and religiosity. To be notice that this finding consistently holds also when controlling for an expanded set of characteristics throughout the analysis.

The well-established findings on correlates of redistributive preferences conveyed by the literature are largely confirmed: the age of respondent follows a hump-shaped pattern, with preferences for redistribution initially increasing while aging, peaking, and then decreasing;[17] both income and educational attainment are significantly associated with lower demand for redistribution; moving to the right along the political spectrum is linked to a decrease in demand for redistribution; and unemployed and retired individuals demand for more redistribution compared to those currently in paid work. Contrary to the available evidence, individual religiosity is not significantly related to preferences for redistribution at the aggregate level, whereas married, divorced, and widowed individuals consistently show lower support for redistribution compared to singles.

Then, we step wise add the interaction terms between the female dummy and income, education, marital status, and occupational status, respectively. Since interpreting interaction (conditional) effects on the basis of regression tables is generally misleading, following Brambor *et al.* (2006), we provide graphical summaries of the partial correlations computed from our regression results. The gender gap in pro-redistribution preferences is always significantly positive and increasing with household income and the level of education attained, as displayed in Figure 2A and 2B. This means that the higher the income of the household and the level of education, the larger the difference between women and men in their pro-redistribution attitudes. Furthermore, divorced women demonstrate higher redistributive preferences compared to their male counterparts, resulting in a wider gender gap, which narrows for singles and married individuals, and even more for widowed ones, as shown

[17] Alesina and Giuliano (2011) and Ashok *et al.* (2015).

in Figure 2C. The gender gap also varies according to the occupational status, being wider among working women and men, and narrower among the unemployed and retired individuals (Figure 2D).

[Table 2 and Figures 2 and 3 here]

In Figure 3, we focus on the role of political ideology and individual religiosity. We show that there is no discernible difference in preferences for redistribution between left-wing women and left-wing men; in contrast, a clear gender gap exists between right-wing women and right-wing men. More precisely, right-wing women, on average, are significantly more supportive of redistribution than their male counterparts. Individual religiosity instead is not significantly related to preferences for redistribution, while the gender gap exists and reduces for high religious individuals.

To capture the individuals' history of misfortune, we extend the specification in Equation (1), including an indicator for having experienced a period of unemployment and one for having ever divorced. Both are also interacted with the female dummy. Women who encountered either a period of unemployment or a divorce are significantly more redistributive than their male counterparts.[18]

Similarly, in a new specification, we add to Equation (1) a second set of covariates, Z_{it}, which includes a series of further beliefs and attitudes that might affect the demand for redistribution and relative differences by genders, i.e., beliefs about the importance of being treated equally, fairness, trust in politicians, and satisfaction with National Government, first individually and then each interacted with the female dummy.

We obtain the following specification:

$$RedPref_{it} = \alpha + \beta_0 \text{Female}_i + \beta_1 \text{X}_{it} + + \beta_2 \text{Z}_{it} + \beta_3 (\text{Female}_{it} * \text{Z}_{it}) + \eta_t + \theta_c + \varepsilon_{it} \tag{3}$$

Figure 4 visualizes the resulting partial correlations.[19] First, the higher the egalitarian beliefs of individuals, the higher the taste for redistribution overall, and the narrower the gap. Second, greater perceptions of fairness correlate with lower preferences in aggregate,[20] but with a wider gap. We also find that, although negatively associated with redistributive preferences in aggregate in our sample (similarly to the evidence in Grimalda and Pipke 2021), trust in politicians is correlated with a wider gender gap. A similar pattern is observed when we look at individuals' satisfaction with the

[18] These results are presented in Columns 3-5 in Table A.1. The partial correlations are reported at the bottom of the table, together with their significance.

[19] Results are presented in Table A.2.

[20] Alesina and Angeletos (2005), Roth and Wohlfart (2018).

national government: overall, preferences decrease, but women's preferences decline less than men's, thus widening the gender gap.

[Figure 4 here]

4.1.1 How much of the Gender Gap in Preferences is explained by Individual Factors? A Gelbach Decomposition

Having included these two sets of covariates in our model, we proceed to assess how much these factors matter quantitatively to explain the gender gap in preferences for redistribution. To this end, we adopt the Gelbach (2016) decomposition methodology.[21] This approach allows us to measure the extent to which each covariate contributes to the change in the coefficient on the gender dummy variable. Specifically, it quantifies the influence of each covariate on the shift observed when moving from a baseline regression that includes only gender and fixed effects to a comprehensive regression incorporating all variables.

Results are reported in Table 3. The baseline specification in the first row presents the coefficient of our focal variable of interest, the female dummy, when only controlling for a full set of interview-year and country fixed effects, without including any additional factor. The second and the third rows instead show the female dummy coefficient after including additional covariates. We propose two versions of the full specification: in model 1, we include the covariates introduced in Equation (1). More precisely, we group socio-economic characteristics (i.e., age, legal marital status, and occupational status), income and education, and beliefs and attitudes (i.e., political ideology and religiosity). In model 2, we augment the full specification to include all the single regressors as in Equation (2). The results reveal interesting insights. Model 1 shows that the explained variation of the female coefficient might be attributed by 56 percent to income and education and by 64 percent to beliefs and attitudes. In model 2, income and education account for a smaller portion of the explained variation of the female coefficient (30 percent), whereas beliefs and attitudes contribute significantly more (81 percent). In both specifications, socio-demographic characteristics attenuate the observed gender gap in our sample, except for age. Next section will tackle the issue of gender-cohort gaps more specifically.

Two considerations emerge from the decomposition analysis. First, it is worth noticing that, as

[21] We prefer this approach to the more standard Oaxaca-Blinder (O-B) decomposition, often employed in gender-related outcomes, since it allows us to test different specifications without the limitation of the O-B method due to its sensitiveness to the variable addition order (Gelbach 2016). Moreover, this methodology allows to precisely quantify the contribution of both grouped covariates and individual variables to the model.

widely documented in the literature, income accounts for a large part of the existing gap in preferences, confirming the self-interest/insurance hypothesis. However, this source of disparity is weaker than expected, given the relevance of income and income prospects in prior literature. Instead, the bulk of the gap is jointly explained by differences in beliefs and attitudes. Political alignment accounts for 28 percent of the gap, egalitarian beliefs for the 42.9 percent, and satisfaction with the national government explains a smaller portion (5.7 percent).

The second consideration concerns the extent to whether we are able to fully explain gender differences in redistributive preferences. The portion of the gender gap in preferences for redistribution unexplained by differences in individuals' characteristics and attitudes is substantial, in both full specifications, and is larger than the part of the gap actually explained. In model 1, only one-fifth (19 percent) of the overall gap is explained by commonly detected determinants, while incorporating additional beliefs and attitudes in model 2 increases the explained portion to one-third (32 percent) of the gender gap. This leaves the majority of the gap unexplained, potentially suggesting the existence of further determinants of the gender gap beyond individual determinants and the need to investigate contextual factors, such as economic environment, social norms, and institutional design across countries.

4.1.2 How Do Gender Gaps in Redistribution Preferences Vary by Age Cohort?

Notwithstanding the fact that age is generally included in all regressions of preferences for redistribution by default, the intersection of gender and generational factors remains significantly underexplored. For this reason, we dedicate a specific digression to this dimension by estimating Equation (4). Then, in the rest of the analysis, these gender-generational effects are also accounted for.

$$RedPref_{it} = \alpha + \beta_0 \text{Female}_i + \beta_1 \text{X}_{it} + + \beta_2 \text{Agegroup}_{it} + \beta_3 (\text{Female}_{it} * \text{Agegroup}_{it}) + \eta_{it} + \theta_{it} + \varepsilon_{it} \quad (4)$$

[Figure 5 here]

As mentioned above, age presents an inverted-U relationship with preferences for redistribution.[22] In Figure 5A, we observe that the gender gap in preferences for redistribution also varies with age,

[22] Our results are in line with Alesina and Giuliano (2011) and Ashok *et al.* (2015). However, the literature offers mixed findings on the influence of age on preferences for redistribution. Some studies suggest that support for redistribution increases with age (Luttmer and Singhal 2011, Gärtner *et al.* 2017, Roth and Wohlfart 2018), while others indicate that younger people are more supportive of redistribution (Alesina and La Ferrara 2005; Luttmer 2001; Beraldo *et al.* 2022). Finally, Edlund and Svallfors (2012) instead find minimal cohort differences which tend to converge over time.

displaying a hump-shaped relationship as well. It starts off significant at younger ages, peaks around 40 years of age, and then diminishes, becoming negligible and statistically not significant between ages 80 and 90. Interestingly, beyond this age, the gender gap reverses in favour of men. When examining age groups, men consistently exhibit less support for redistribution than women (see Figure 5B): the gender gap is widest among adults, followed by young individuals, then mature individuals, and finally the elderly. From a different perspective, a similar pattern is observed when considering generations. In Figure 5C, the gender gap is most pronounced among Generation X, followed by Millennials and Boomers, with a similar gender gap, followed by the Generation Z, and finally the Silent Generation showing with the narrowest disparity.[23]

4.2 Including Macro-level Variables: Is there a Role for "the Context"?

In this section, we now argue that preferences for redistribution and the heterogeneity in preferences for redistribution between women and men (if exists) are also a function of the socio-economic, institutional, and cultural conditions at the country level. Thus, we evaluate whether macro-level characteristics correlate to preferences for redistribution and whether men and women's preferences are differently influenced as context varies.

First, we focus on the selection of national-level macroeconomic variables as described in Section 2. More precisely, we modify the baseline Equation (1) and include the following macro-level indicators, i.e., the Gini Index, per capita GNI, the Gender Equality Index, and the country's religiosity, first one at a time, singularly and then interacted with the female dummy, and finally all together with their interactions with the female dummy. The estimated equation becomes the following one:

$$RedPref_{it} = \alpha + \beta_0 \text{Female}_i + \beta_1 \text{X}_{it} + +\beta_2 \text{Macro}_{ct} + \beta_3 (\text{Female}_{it} * \text{Macro}_{ct}) + \eta_t + \theta_c + \varepsilon_{it} \qquad (5)$$

[Figures 6 and 7 here]

In order to reach a deeper insight, we run the same specification as above, also differentiating by age groups, since, as we have seen, preferences are highly heterogeneous both between men and women, but also within men and women of different ages.

$$RedPref_{it} = \alpha + \beta_0 \text{Female}_i + \beta_1 \text{X}_{it} + \beta_2 \text{Macro}_{ct} +$$

[23] Results are presented in Table A.3 in the Appendix.

$$+ \beta_3(\text{Female}_{it} * \text{Macro}_{ct}) + \beta_4(\text{Female}_{it} * \text{Agegroup}_{it}) + \eta_t + \theta_c + \varepsilon_{it} \quad (6)$$

[Figures 8 and 9 here]

Again, in all these further specifications, we are interested in the coefficients of the female dummy and those of each interaction between the female dummy and the selected macro-level variable. Partial correlations computed from Equation (5) are shown in Figures 6 and 7, while those computed from Equation (6) in Figures 8 and 9.[24]

Our estimates show that preferences for redistribution among both women and men are not related to income inequality *per se*, measured by the Gini coefficient, not confirming over the present data the well-known finding that greater income inequality corresponds to stronger support for redistribution. However, a statistically significant gender gap in preferences for redistribution exists: for low levels of inequality, it is more pronounced for adults, while less relevant for the elderly. This gender gap tends to diminish as the Gini coefficient rises. This suggests that in countries with higher levels of income inequality, women and men show more similar levels of support for redistribution. In other words, income inequality acts as a preference leveller (Figures 6A and 8B).

As for per capita GNI, our results reveal a negative but not statistically significant relationship with average preferences for redistribution among both women and men. Contrastingly, men consistently exhibit lower preferences for redistribution compared to women, and this gender gap widens as per capita GNI increases. In poorer countries, both men and women, express higher preferences for redistribution than in richer countries and are not significantly different from each other, as shown in Figure 6C. Looking at the age groups, young men's preferences are the most sensitive to increases in per capita GNI, while women's average preference remain more stable across cohorts. Additionally, older women and men are the least different in terms of redistributive preferences (see Figures 8C and 8D).

Also for Gender Equality, it emerges a negative, though not significant, relationship with the average preferences for redistribution among both women and men. As depicted in Figure 7A, we notice that in countries characterized by low gender equality, the gender gap in preferences for redistribution is reversed, with women exhibiting less support for redistribution compared to men. However, until the GEI scores above 0.7 no significant gender gap in redistributive preferences is observed. Similarly to Bozzano *et al.*, 2024., as the GEI increases, women tend to decrease their demand for redistribution

[24] Results are presented in Tables A.4 and A.5 in the Appendix.

at a slower rate than men, leading to a widening of the gender gap in preferences for redistribution. For both adult and young individuals, gender gap increases with the level of gender equality due to a negligible reduction of the average preference of women compared to that of men. On the contrary, the widening of the gender gaps referred to mature adults and the elderly arises from increasing average preferences for women and decreasing average preferences for men. Still, the previous findings about older men and women being the least divergent cohort in terms of preferences for redistribution is still confirmed (Figures 9A and 9B).

Finally, in countries with high levels of religiosity, women and men exhibit a greater similarity in their preferences for less redistribution compared to countries with lower levels of religiosity, where especially men tend to express less support for redistribution (Figures 7C and 9C). This evidence contradicts the existing literature, which generally indicates a negative correlation between religiosity and demand for social spending (e.g., Scheve and Stasavage, 2006).[25] At the same time, this evidence suggests that men's preferences for redistribution might be more influenced by secularization compared to women's preferences, mainly in the case of the middle-aged group (Figure 9D).[26]

4.2.1 The Gender Gap in Preferences for Redistribution across Welfare Regimes

To gauge the impact of different welfare state regimes and degrees of welfare provision, we run the same specification as in Equation (1) for each welfare regime, separately. Then, we also differentiate by age group. The estimated partial correlations are shown in Figure 10 and in Figure 11. [27]

[Figures 10 and 11 here]

A persistent gender gap in preferences for redistribution is evident across all welfare regimes, consistently with the findings of Svalfors (1997), as shown in Figure 10. The gap is more pronounced in Social Democratic regimes, narrower for Conservatives, followed by Former USSR, Liberal, and East European countries. In Mediterranean countries, instead, both men and women on aggregate exhibit more similar preferences for redistribution.

Figure 11 disaggregates the above results by age groups and uncovers some interesting patterns. In Social Democratic welfare systems, the gender gap is largest among adult women and men, followed

[25] However, it is worth noticing that when disaggregating preferences by cohorts, elderly men and women as well as mature women show decreasing preferences parly confirming Scheve and Stasavage's evidence (see Figure 9C).

[26] In a full specification, we include all macro-level variables with their interactions with the female dummy, as reported in Table A.4 column 9. Results described in text are qualitatively unchanged, even more statistically significant. Figures 6B, 6D, 7B, 7D show the estimated partial correlations of the female dummy with each macro-level variable, calculated keeping all the others at their mean values.

[27] Results are presented in Table A.5 and A.6, respectively.

by young and mature individuals, with the elderly showing the smallest disparity (though remaining very large compared to other age groups in other welfare systems). Similarly, adults women and men are also the most dissimilar in Liberal and in East European welfare systems, though the magnitude is approximately half than that observed in Social Democratic regimes. In Former USSR welfare regimes, gender differences are equally relevant among adults and mature adults. In conservative welfare regimes, the gender gap is large and the same for youth, adults, and mature adults, while narrower for the elderly. Contrastingly, Mediterranean welfare systems exhibit a very narrow gender gap for adults and the elderly, even a not significant one for mature adults, but a very large gap between young women and men.

In these respects, going back to Figure 5 allows us to make a further consideration. Indeed, while gender gaps are more pronounced among adults –after having partialled out the effect of all other socio-economic and demographic characteristics– this pattern is not observed in all countries. Conditional on the the welfare systems, the heterogeneity across genders and within genders acquires different nuances, highlighting the highly specific influence of (institutional) context on redistributive gender gaps.

Moreover, it is worth noting that welfare regimes characterized by larger gender gaps seem to present two paradoxical features. On the one hand, these regimes tend to be more generous in terms of welfare provision and higher levels of public spending (e.g., Nordic countries). Yet, aggregate preferences to redistribution tend to be lower on average. On the other hand, in these regimes gender equality is generally higher. This seems to be a double puzzle in the literature. The first mechanism is tied to the so-called "thermostatic model" of preferences and policy responsiveness (Wlezien, 1995). The idea behind is that as welfare policies become more generous, public demand for redistribution decreases in a kind of preference adjustment process. As a result, in high-spending welfare regimes, individuals may perceive less need for further redistribution, which could partially explain the overall lower preference levels. However, according to our evidence, larger gender gaps are present. The second mechanism is generally referred to as the "gender equality paradox" and has been already encountered in our analysis in the previous section. Again, as seen in Bozzano et al. (2024), greater gender equality amplifies differences in women and men's preferences and enable them to act in order to freely pursue their differentiated priorities. Within our analysis, this seems to be particularly significant during adulthood, a life-cycle stage in which women make key decisions about family and career and are more likely to encounter higher levels of exposure to risk, either financial or socio-economic, making

the gender gap for redistributive policies particularly relevant.

4.3 Dynamics: Are Women and Men Drifting Apart Recently?

A final question concerns the evolution of the gender gaps in preferences for redistribution through time in the last twenty years, from 2002 to 2022. Thus, we divide the investigated period into 5 intervals, each comprising two ESS rounds. For each interval, we re-estimate the specification in Equation (1) in order to compare the gender gap across periods.[28] Figure 12 reveals a quite significant gender gap in the initial period (2002-2006), which has steadily decreased over time. By the final period (2018-2022), the gap has nearly halved in size with respect to the beginning. When we disaggregate these trends by age group, we notice that the dynamics of the gender gap widely vary. Among younger individuals, the gender gap starts wide, then decreases by the third period, to expand again in the final period, wider than its initial size. Adult women and men begin very dissimilar, become even more dissimilar, and then gradually converge in the last three intervals, though substantial differences remain. Among middle-aged individuals, the gap fluctuates across periods, alternating between widening and narrowing, before converging in the final period. The elderly show a wide gender gap in the first period but then gradually diminishes and ultimately become not statistically significant, thus negligible. In summary, the emerging pattern reveals a gradual convergence over time of the gender gap in preferences for redistribution, yet this aggregate trend hides notable diverging dynamics. Recently, young women and men are indeed drifting apart, while mature and older individual are not. Adult women and men, on the other hand, consistently diverge across all periods.

[Figures 12 and 13 here]

5 Conclusion

This study provides a comprehensive examination of gender gaps in preferences for redistribution across European citizens from 2002 to 2022. By analysing survey data from the ESS over two decades, the following main lessons have emerged.

First, our findings confirm that women are, on aggregate, consistently more redistributive than men. A substantial part of this gap can be attributed to gender differences in socio-economic status, political ideology, and egalitarian beliefs. However, a residual non-negligible gap between women and

[28] Results are presented in Tables A.7 and A.8, respectively.

men remains unexplained, even after having accounted for an extensive set of individual characteristics. This unexplained gender gap is highly relevant for both the academic and the public debates: it can be the case that we are missing some relevant factors, either because they are not measurable and thus not included into the estimation model, or because we still lack a clear theoretical framework to account for differences between men and women. Regardless of the reasons behind, this paucity could potentially lead to the prioritization of the "wrong" demographic groups through policies.

Second, not all women are more redistributive than men. The gender gaps indeed are neither uniform across subgroups nor along different individual attributes or contextual conditions. Overall, we claim that gender gaps are more pronounced among adults, but this evidence varies along macroeconomic context and across welfare regimes. This suggests that contextual factors do play a relevant role in differentially shaping redistributive preferences across genders. Again, failing to account for such heterogeneity in redistributive attitudes could result in policies that fail to reflect the actual priorities and needs of different population subgroups.

Third, these gaps are not static over time. Despite a general trend of convergence in redistributive preferences observed over the last two decades, driven by shifting socio-economic factors and evolving norms, significant divergence persists across subgroups, more specifically among young and adult individuals with respect to older ones.

In terms of policy implications, this research argues that women are a crucial demographic group in shaping redistributive preferences. Due to their increasing political engagement, especially in recent times, women now represent a large part of the electorate in many European countries. Thus, women are a critical force in democratic processes and matter for voting outcomes and party platform design. Their swing potential in determining electorate results is prompting political parties to address gender-specific policies: women are becoming swing voters whose support depends on how well political platforms are able to resonate with their priorities, namely work-life reconciliation and family-related welfare policies such as parental leaves or subsidized childcare. Furthermore, since the redistributive focus has recently intensified on those policies that target aging populations, especially through pensions and elderly care programs, the current design of policies risks falling short of addressing the needs of younger generations, disproportionally impacting women and reinforcing gender inequality in manifold dimensions. Given these considerations, policymakers need to attentively look at gender- (and cohort-) specific imbalances in redistributive preferences, since those policies that strongly prioritize one group's preferences could be undesirable among the other groups, in particular

in a context where preferences are highly heterogeneous as shown in this study. Finally, increasing political representation of women would guarantee that their different policy preferences are effectively implemented in policy agendas.

Future research should further investigate whether the salience of women's issues for platform adjustment, on the one hand, and a larger political representation of women, on the other, would ultimately translate into a gender-sensitive alignment of policy outcomes.

References

[1] Alesina, A., Angeletos, G., 2005. Fairness and Redistribution: US vs. Europe. *American Economic Review*, 95, 913-935.

[2] Alesina, A.F., Giuliano, P., 2010. The Power of the Family. *Journal of Economic Growth*, 15, 93-125.

[3] Alesina, A., Giuliano, P., 2011. Preferences For Redistribution. In Benhabib J., Bisin A., Jackson M. O. (eds) *Handbook of Social Economics*, North Holland, 93-132.

[4] Alesina, A., La Ferrara, E., 2005. Preferences for Redistribution in the Land of Opportunities. *Journal of Public Economics*, 89, 897-931.

[5] Alesina, A., Miano, A., Stantcheva, S., 2023. Immigration and Redistribution. *The Review of Economic Studies*, 90(1), 1–39.

[6] Alesina, A., Stantcheva, S., Teso, E., 2018. Intergenerational mobility and preferences for redistribution. *American Economic Review*, 108(2), 521–554.

[7] Alvarez, M.R., McCaffery, E.J., 2003. Are there sex differences in fiscal political preferences? *Political Research Quarterly*, 56(1), 5–17.

[8] Andreoli, F., Olivera, J., 2020. Preferences for redistribution and exposure to tax-benefit schemes in Europe. *European Journal of Political Economy*, 63, 101880.

[9] Angelov, N., Johansson, P., Lindahl, E., 2016. Parenthood and the gender gap in pay. *Journal of Labor Economics*, 34(3), 545–579.

[10] Ashok, V., Kuziemko, I., Washington, E., 2015. Support for Redistribution in an Age of Rising Inequality: New Stylized Facts and Some Tentative Explanations. Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 367-405.

[11] Assandri, M., Maffioletti, A., Piacenza, M., Turati, G., 2018. Risk Attitudes and Preferences for Redistribution: New Evidence from the Lab. *CESifo Economic Studies*, 64, 489-515.

[12] Attewell, D., 2022. Redistribution attitudes and vote choice across the educational divide. *European Journal of Political Research*, 61, 1080-1101.

[13] Bellani L., Fazio A., Scervini F., 2023. Collective negative shocks and preferences for redistribution: Evidence from the COVID-19 crisis in Germany. *Journal of Economic Inequality*, 21, 381–403.

[14] Bénabou, R., Ok, E., 2001. Social Mobility and the Demand for Redistribution: The POUM Hypothesis. *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 116(2), 447-487.

[15] Bénabou, R., Tirole, J., 2006. Belief in a Just World and Redistributive Politics. *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 121(2), 699-746.

[16] Beraldo, S., Piacenza, M., Turati, G., 2022. The Importance of the Future when Deciding Levels of Personal Responsibility and Demand for Redistribution. *Economic Modelling*, 116, 105982.

[17] Bertrand, M., 2011. New Perspectives on Gender, in Card, D., Ashenfelter, O., (Eds.) *Handbook of Labor Economics*, Elsevier, Volume 4B, 1543-1590.

[18] Bertrand, M., 2020. Gender in the Twenty-First Century. *American Economic Association: Papers and Proceedings*, 110: 1–24.

[19] Bozzano, M., Profeta, P., Puglisi, R., Scabrosetti, S., 2024. Women's voice on redistribution: From gender equality to equalizing taxation. *European Journal of Political Economy*, 81, 102497.

[20] Bozzano, M., Scabrosetti, S., 2024. Preferences for Redistribution: Two Decades of Gender Gaps and Generational Differences in Europe, *CESifo Economic Studies*, 70, 320-345.

[21] Buser, T., Grimalda, G., Putterman, L., van der Weele, J., 2020. Overconfidence and gender gaps in redistributive preferences: Cross-country experimental evidence. *Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization*, 178, 267–286.

[22] Casarico, A., Lattanzio, S., 2023. Behind the child penalty: understanding what contributes to the labour market costs of motherhood. *Journal of Population Economics*, 36(3), 1489-1511.

[23] Costa-Font, J., Cowell, F., 2015. Social identity and redistributive preferences: a survey. *Journal of Economic Survey*, 29(2), 357-374.

[24] Croson, R., Gneezy, U., 2009. Gender Differences in Preferences. *Journal of Economic Literature*, 47, 448–474.

[25] Cruces, G., Perez-Truglia, R., Tetaz, M., 2012. Biased Perceptions of Income Distribution and Preferences for Redistribution: Evidence from a Survey Experiment. *Journal of Public Economics*, 98, 100-112.

[26] Dahlberg M. , Edmark K., Lundqvist H., 2012. Ethnic Diversity and Preferences for Redistribution. *Journal of Political Economy*, 120(1), 41-76.

[27] Dimick M. , Rueda D. , Stegmueller D., 2016. The altruistic rich? inequality and other-regarding preferences for redistribution. *Quarterly Journal of Political Science*, 11(4), 385-439.

[28] Dimick M. , Rueda D. , Stegmueller D., 2018. Models of other-regarding preferences, inequality and redistribution. *Annual Review of Political Science*, 21, 441-460

[29] Durante, R., Putterman, L., Van der Weele, J., 2014. Preferences for redistribution and perception of fairness: An experimental study. *Journal of the European Economic Association*, 12(4), 1059–1086.

[30] Edlund, L., Pande, R., 2002. Why have Women Become Left-Wing? The Political Gender Gap and the Decline in Marriage. *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 117, 917-961.

[31] Edlund, J., Svallfors, S., 2012. Cohort, class and attitudes to redistribution in two liberal welfare states: Britain and the United States, 1996–2006, in *Ageing Populations in Post-Industrial Democracies: Comparative Studies of Policies and Politics*, Oxford: Routledge, 206–225.

[32] Esping-Andersen, G., 1990. *The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism*, Cambridge, UK: Polity Press.

[33] Fazio, A. 2024. Preferences for Redistribution. In: Zimmermann, K.F. (eds) *Handbook of Labor, Human Resources and Population Economics*, Springer, Cham.

[34] Fehr, E., Epper, T., Senn, J., 2024. Social Preferences and Redistributive Politics. *The Review of Economics and Statistics*, doi:https://doi.org/10.1162/rest_a_01511.

[35] Fenger, H., 2007. Welfare Regimes in Central and Eastern Europe: Incorporating Post-Communist Countries in a Welfare Regime Typology. *Contemporary Issues and Ideas in Social Sciences*, 3, 1–30.

[36] Ferrera, M., 1996. The "Southern Model" of Welfare in Social Europe. *Journal of European Social Policy*, 6, 17–37.

[37] Fisman R. , Jakiela P. , Kariv S., 2015. How did distributional preferences change during the Great Recession? *Journal of Public Economics*, 128, 84-95.

[38] Fong, C., 2001. Social preferences, self-interest, and the demand for redistribution. *Journal of Public Economics*, 82(2), 225-246.

[39] Gärtner, M., Möllerström, J., Seim, D., 2017. Individual risk preferences and the demand for redistribution. *Journal of Public Economics*, 153, 49–55.

[40] Gelbach, J.B., 2016. When Do Covariates Matter? And Which Ones, and How Much? *Journal of Labor Economics*, 34(2), 509-543.

[41] Giger, N., 2009. Towards a modern gender gap in Europe?: A comparative analysis of voting behavior in 12 countries. *The Social Science Journal*, 46(3), 474–492.

[42] Grimalda, G., Pipke, D., 2021. Cross-country evidence on the determinants of preferences for redistribution, No 2190, Kiel Working Papers, Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW Kiel).

[43] Grimalda, G., Farina, F., Schmidt, U., 2018. Preferences for redistribution in the US, Italy, Norway: An experiment study. Technical report, Kiel working paper.

[44] Guillaud, E., 2013. Preferences for redistribution: an empirical analysis over 33 countries. *Journal of Economic Inequality* 11, 57–78.

[45] Hess, G. D., 2004. Marriage and Consumption Insurance: What's Love Got to Do with It? *Journal of Political Economy*, 112(2), 290–318.

[46] Hessami, Z., Lopes da Fonseca, M., 2020. Female Political Representation and Substantive Effects on Policies: A Literature Review. *European Journal of Political Economy*, 63, 101896.

[47] Inglehart, R., Norris, P., 2000. The Developmental Theory of the Gender Gap: Women's and Men's Voting Behavior in Global Perspective. *International Political Science Review / Revue Internationale de Science Politique*, 21, 441-463.

[48] Iversen, T., Rosenbluth, F., 2006. The political economy of gender: explaining cross-national variation in the gender division of labor and the gender voting gap. *American Journal of Political Science*, 50(1), 1–19.

[49] Jaeger, M.M., 2006. Welfare Regimes and Attitudes towards Redistribution: The Regime Hypothesis Revisited. *European Sociological Review*, 22(2), 157-170.

[50] Jaeger, M.M., 2013. The effect of macroeconomic and social conditions on the demand for redistribution: a pseudo panel approach. *Journal of European Social Policy*, 23, 149–163.

[51] Kambayashi, R., Lechevalier, S., 2022. Why do Redistributive Policies Differ across Countries? Analyzing the Multiple Dimensions of Preferences for Redistribution. *Review of Income and Wealth*, 68(4), 1032-1057.

[52] Keely, L., Tan, C., 2008. Understanding preferences for income redistribution. *Journal of Public Economics*, 92, 944-961.

[53] Kleven, H., Landais, C., Posch, J., Steinhauer, A., Zweimuller, J., 2019. Child penalties across countries: Evidence and explanations. *American Economic Association: Papers and Proceedings*, 109, 122–26

[54] Kourtellos A., Petrou K., 2022. The role of social interactions in preferences for redistribution. *Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization*, 200, 716-737.

[55] Kudrnáč, A., Petrúšek, I., 2022. The Polls—Trends: Welfare Regimes and Support for Income Redistribution in Europe. *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 86(4), 968–996.

[56] Lis, M., Bonthuis, B., 2020. Drivers of the gender gap in pensions: evidence from EU-SILC and the OECD pension models. Chapter 18. In Holzmann, R., Palmer, E., Palacios, R., Sacchi, S. [Eds.], *Progress and Challenges of Nonfinancial Defined Contribution Pension Schemes*, vol. 2, World Bank Group, 25-54.

[57] Luttmer, E., 2001. Group Loyalty and the Taste for Redistribution. *Journal of Political Economy*, 109(3), 500-528.

[58] Luttmer, E.F.P., Singhal, M., 2011. Culture, context, and the taste for redistribution. *American Economic Journal: Economic Policy*, 3(1), 157-79.

[59] Olivera, J., 2014. Preferences for Redistribution after the Economic Crisis. *Economics and Business Letters*, 3(3), 137-145.

[60] Olivera, J., 2015. Preferences for Redistribution in Europe. *IZA Journal of European Labor Studies*, 4(14), 1-18.

[61] Olivetti C., Petrongolo, B., 2016. The Evolution of Gender Gaps in Industrialized Countries. *Annual Review of Economics*, 8, 405-434.

[62] Piketty, T., 1995. Social Mobility and Redistributive Politics. *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 110(3), 551-584.

[63] Ranehill, E., Weber, R.A., 2022. Gender preference gaps and voting for redistribution. *Experimental Economics*, 25, 845–875.

[64] Roth, C., Wohlfart, J., 2018. Experienced inequality and preferences for redistribution. *Journal of Public Economics*, 167, 251-262.

[65] Scheve, K., Stasavage, D., 2006. Religion and Preferences for Social Insurance. *Quarterly Journal of Political Science*, 1(3), 255-286.

[66] Shapiro, R.Y., Mahajan, H., 1986. Gender differences in policy preferences: a summary of trends from the 1960s to the 1980s. *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 50(1), 42–61.

[67] Shorrocks, R., Grasso, M.T., 2020. The attitudinal gender gap across generations: support for redistribution and government spending in contexts of high and low welfare provision. *European Political Science Review*, 12(3), 289-306.

[68] Svallfors, S., 1997. Worlds of welfare and attitudes to redistribution: A comparison of eight western nations. *European Sociological Review*, 13, 3, 283–304.

[69] Varian, H.R., 1980. Redistributive taxation as social insurance, *Journal of Public Economics*, 14(1), 49-68,

[70] Wlezien, C., 1995. The Public as Thermostat: Dynamics of Preferences for Spending. *American Journal of Political Science*, 39(4), 981–1000.

Tables and Figures

Table 1: Summary statistics

	All					Men					Women				
	Obs	Mean	Std. Dev	Min	Max	Obs	Mean	Std. Dev	Min	Max	Obs	Mean	Std. Dev	Min	Max
Preferences for Redistribution	299653	3.87	1.03	1	5	145008	3.78	1.08	1	5	154645	3.94	0.99	1	5
Female dummy	299653	0.52	0.50	0	1	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.
Age	299653	49.36	17.83	14	110	145008	48.98	17.80	14	110	154645	49.72	17.84	14	102
Household income	299653	5.60	2.75	1	12	145008	5.85	2.72	1	12	154645	5.37	2.75	1	12
Education - primary or less	299653	0.26	0.44	0	1	145008	0.25	0.43	0	1	154645	0.27	0.45	0	1
Education - secondary	299653	0.48	0.50	0	1	145008	0.50	0.50	0	1	154645	0.46	0.50	0	1
Education - tertiary	299653	0.26	0.44	0	1	145008	0.25	0.43	0	1	154645	0.27	0.44	0	1
Single	299653	0.27	0.44	0	1	145008	0.30	0.46	0	1	154645	0.24	0.43	0	1
Married	299653	0.54	0.50	0	1	145008	0.57	0.49	0	1	154645	0.51	0.50	0	1
Divorced	299653	0.10	0.31	0	1	145008	0.09	0.28	0	1	154645	0.12	0.32	0	1
Widowed	299653	0.09	0.29	0	1	145008	0.04	0.20	0	1	154645	0.13	0.34	0	1
Paid work	299653	0.59	0.49	0	1	145008	0.60	0.49	0	1	154645	0.59	0.49	0	1
In Education	299653	0.06	0.24	0	1	145008	0.06	0.24	0	1	154645	0.06	0.24	0	1
Unemployed	299653	0.05	0.22	0	1	145008	0.06	0.23	0	1	154645	0.05	0.21	0	1
Retired	299653	0.25	0.43	0	1	145008	0.25	0.43	0	1	154645	0.25	0.43	0	1
Housework	299653	0.08	0.27	0	1	145008	0.01	0.12	0	1	154645	0.14	0.35	0	1
Other activities	299653	0.04	0.18	0	1	145008	0.04	0.19	0	1	154645	0.03	0.18	0	1
Main Source of HH Income	299653	1.90	1.28	1	7	145008	1.87	1.26	1	7	154645	1.93	1.30	1	7
Political ideology	299653	5.11	2.24	0	10	145008	5.19	2.27	0	10	154645	5.03	2.21	0	10
Religiosity	299653	4.64	3.03	0	10	145008	4.17	3.01	0	10	154645	5.07	3.00	0	10
Ever been divorced	262580	0.14	0.35	0	1	126231	0.13	0.34	0	1	136349	0.15	0.36	0	1
Unemployed last 12 months	82303	0.45	0.50	0	1	40482	0.42	0.49	0	1	41821	0.48	0.50	0	1
Importance equal treatment	292155	4.93	1.04	1	6	141093	4.87	1.06	1	6	151062	4.99	1.01	1	6
Fairness	298424	5.75	2.27	0	10	144491	5.70	2.25	0	10	153933	5.80	2.28	0	10
Trust in politicians	297392	3.74	2.39	0	10	144220	3.76	2.40	0	10	153172	3.72	2.37	0	10
Satisfaction national gov.	295672	4.39	2.46	0	10	143538	4.46	2.50	0	1	152134	4.33	2.42	0	10
Youth	299653	0.10	0.31	0	1	145008	0.11	0.31	0	1	154645	0.10	0.30	0	1
Adult	299653	0.42	0.49	0	1	145008	0.42	0.49	0	1	154645	0.42	0.49	0	1
Mature adult	299653	0.26	0.44	0	1	145008	0.26	0.44	0	1	154645	0.26	0.44	0	1
Elderly	299653	0.21	0.41	0	1	145008	0.21	0.41	0	1	154645	0.22	0.41	0	1
Z Generation	299653	0.02	0.14	0	1	145008	0.02	0.14	0	1	154645	0.02	0.13	0	1
Millennials	299653	0.17	0.37	0	1	145008	0.17	0.38	0	1	154645	0.16	0.37	0	1
X Generation	299653	0.28	0.45	0	1	145008	0.27	0.45	0	1	154645	0.28	0.45	0	1
Boomers	299653	0.34	0.47	0	1	145008	0.34	0.47	0	1	154645	0.34	0.47	0	1
Silent Generation	299653	0.17	0.38	0	1	145008	0.17	0.38	0	1	154645	0.18	0.38	0	1
Gini index	289	28.73	3.64	22.00	40.00	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.
GNI pc (thousand dollars)	382	42634.09	14127.73	11099.33	87012.01	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.
Gender equality index	382	0.88	0.08	0.47	0.98	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.
Country's Religiosity	390	4.74	1.01	2.11	7.67	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.

Table 2: Preferences for redistribution: individual characteristics

Preferences for redistribution	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
	b/se	b/se	b/se	b/se	b/se
Female dummy	0.109***	0.004	0.065***	0.119***	0.144***
	(0.011)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.015)	(0.012)
Age	0.013***	0.013***	0.013***	0.013***	0.013***
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Age squared	-0.000***	-0.000***	-0.000***	-0.000***	-0.000***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Household income	-0.042***	-0.052***	-0.042***	-0.042***	-0.042***
	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)
Education - secondary	-0.041***	-0.041***	-0.060***	-0.042***	-0.043***
	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.013)	(0.012)	(0.012)
Education - tertiary	-0.198***	-0.198***	-0.251***	-0.199***	-0.202***
	(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.024)	(0.021)	(0.021)
Married	-0.022***	-0.022***	-0.021***	-0.015*	-0.022***
	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.008)	(0.007)
Divorced	-0.016**	-0.012	-0.015*	-0.028***	-0.016**
	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.009)	(0.007)
Widowed	-0.077***	-0.067***	-0.072***	-0.042**	-0.065***
	(0.014)	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.020)	(0.013)
In Education	-0.039**	-0.040**	-0.038**	-0.039**	-0.038**
	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.016)
Unemployed	0.098***	0.093***	0.098***	0.099***	0.129***
	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.017)
Retired	0.074***	0.071***	0.072***	0.074***	0.120***
	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.017)
Housework	0.009	0.010	0.014	0.010	0.134***
	(0.011)	(0.010)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.030)
Other activities	0.115***	0.111***	0.114***	0.116***	0.161***
	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.016)
Main Source of HH Income	-0.022***	-0.021***	-0.021***	-0.022***	-0.022***
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)
Political ideology	-0.081***	-0.081***	-0.081***	-0.081***	-0.081***
	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)
Religiosity	0.002	0.002	0.002	0.002	0.002
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)
Female d. * HH Income	.	0.019***	.	.	.
	.	(0.002)	.	.	.
Female d. * Secondary Edu	.	.	0.037***	.	.
	.	.	(0.009)	.	.
Female d. * Tertiary Edu	.	.	0.099***	.	.
	.	.	(0.017)	.	.
Female d. * Married	.	.	.	-0.015	.
	.	.	.	(0.010)	.
Female d. * Divorced	.	.	.	0.019	.
	.	.	.	(0.014)	.
Female d. * Widowed	.	.	.	-0.050**	.
	.	.	.	(0.019)	.
Female d. * In Education	.	.	.	.	-0.006
	.	.	.	.	(0.015)
Female d. * Unemployed	.	.	.	.	-0.065***
	.	.	.	.	(0.023)
Female d. * Retired	.	.	.	.	-0.093***
	.	.	.	.	(0.012)
Female d. * Housework	.	.	.	.	-0.156***
	.	.	.	.	(0.033)
Female d. * Other Activities	.	.	.	.	-0.092***
	.	.	.	.	(0.020)
Interview-year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Country FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Obs.	299653	299653	299653	299653	299653
R-squared	0.144	0.144	0.144	0.144	0.144

OLS estimates with the inclusion of interview-year and country- fixed effects. A constant is always included but unreported. The omitted reference dummy for education is primary, for legal marital status is single, while for occupational status is paid work. Figure 2 shows the estimated partial correlations of the female dummy with redistributive preferences referred to columns 2-5.

Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at country level. *** $p<0.01$, ** $p<0.05$, * $p<0.1$.

Table 3: Gender gap in preferences for redistribution: Gelbach decomposition analysis

	Model 1				Model 2			
	beta	se	p-value	% explained difference	beta	se	p-value	% explained difference
Base specification	0.135***	0.013	0.000	.	0.134***	0.013	0.000	.
Full specification (unexplained difference)	0.109***	0.011	0.000	.	0.091***	0.009	0.000	.
Total explained difference	0.025***	0.007	0.000	.	0.043***	0.007	0.000	.
Contributions to explained difference								
Socio-demographic characteristics	-0.005**	0.002	0.013	-20	-0.005***	0.002	0.005	-11.4
Age	.	.	.	.	0.002**	0.001	0.016	3.4
Legal marital status	.	.	.	.	-0.006***	0.001	0.000	-13.3
Occupational status	.	.	.	.	-0.001	0.001	0.601	-1.5
Income and education	0.014***	0.004	0.000	56	0.013***	0.004	0.000	30.3
Household income	.	.	.	.	0.016***	0.002	0.000	36.8
Education	.	.	.	.	-0.003	0.002	0.210	-6.6
Beliefs and attitudes	0.016***	0.005	0.004	64	0.035***	0.006	0.000	81.1
Political ideology	.	.	.	.	0.012***	0.004	0.001	28.3
Religiosity	.	.	.	.	0.002	0.003	0.468	5.1
Further beliefs and attitudes								
Importance equal treatment	.	.	.	.	0.018***	0.002	0.000	42.9
Fairness	.	.	.	.	-0.000	0.000	0.447	-0.6
Trust in politicians	.	.	.	.	-0.000	0.000	0.296	-0.3
Satisfaction national gov.	.	.	.	.	0.002***	0.000	0.008	5.7
Obs.	299654	.	.	.	285694	.	.	. .

Standard errors are clustered at the country level. *** $p<0.01$, ** $p<0.05$, * $p<0.1$. Interview-year and country- fixed effects are included. % of the explained differences is calculated by dividing the decomposition coefficient on each group by total explained difference. In Model 1, we only include beliefs in terms of political ideology and religiosity. In Model 2, we include both beliefs in terms of political ideology, religiosity, importance of equal treatment, and fairness, and attitudes in terms of trust in politicians and satisfaction with national government.

Figure 1: Gender gap in preferences for redistribution



We show the average preferences for redistribution by ESS round and by gender.

Figure 2: Estimated partial correlations of the female dummy with preferences for redistribution, as a function of income, education, marital, and occupational status



Panels (A), (B), (C), and (D) show the estimated partial correlations of the female dummy with preferences for redistribution, as a function of household income (see Table 2 column 2), educational level (see Table 2 column 3), legal marital status (see Table 2 column 4), and occupational status (see Table 2 column 5). 95% confidence intervals are associated with each point estimate.

Figure 3: Estimated partial correlations of the female dummy with preferences for redistribution, as a function of political ideology and individual religiosity

(A) **(B)**



Panels (A) and (B) show the estimated partial correlations of the female dummy with preferences for redistribution, as a function of political ideology (see Table A.1 column 1) and individual religiosity (see Table A.1 column 2). 95% confidence intervals are associated with each point estimate.

Figure 4: Estimated partial correlations of the female dummy with preferences for redistribution, as a function of individual attitudes and beliefs



Panels (A) and (B) show the estimated partial correlations of the female dummy with preferences for redistribution, as a function of beliefs on equal treatment (see Table A.2 column 2) and on fairness (see Table A.2 column 4), respectively. Panels (C) and (D) show the estimated partial correlations of the female dummy with preferences for redistribution, as a function of attitudes on trust in politicians (see Table A.2 column 6) and on satisfaction with national government (see Table A.2 column 8), respectively. 95% confidence intervals are associated with each point estimate.

Figure 5: Estimated partial correlations of the female dummy with preferences for redistribution, as a function of age, age groups, and generations

(A)



(B)



(C)



Panel (A) shows the estimated partial correlations of the female dummy with preferences for redistribution, as a function of age and age squared (see Table A.3 column 2), while panel (B) and panel (C) show the estimated partial correlations of the female dummy with preferences for redistribution for different age groups (see Table A.3 column 4) and for different generations (see Table A.3 column 6), respectively. 95% confidence intervals are associated with each point estimate.

Figure 6: Estimated partial correlations of the female dummy with preferences for redistribution, as a function of Gini index and per capita GNI



Panels (A) and (B) show the estimated partial correlations of the female dummy with preferences for redistribution, as a function of Gini index (see Table A.4 column 2) and as a function of Gini index when per capita GNI, GEI, and country's religiosity take on their mean values (see Table A.4 column 9). Panels (C) and (D) show the estimated partial correlations of the female dummy with preferences for redistribution, as a function of per capita GNI (see Table A.4 column 4) and as a function of per capita GNI when Gini index, GEI, and country's religiosity take on their mean values (see Table A.4 column 9). 95% confidence intervals are associated with each point estimate.

Figure 7: Estimated partial correlations of the female dummy with preferences for redistribution, as a function of GEI and country's religiosity



Panels (A) and (B) show the estimated partial correlations of the female dummy with preferences for redistribution, as a function of GEI (see Table A.4 column 6) and as a function of GEI when Gini index, per capita GNI, and country's religiosity take on their mean values (see Table A.4 column 9). Panels (C) and (D) show the estimated partial correlations of the female dummy with preferences for redistribution, as a function of country's religiosity (see Table A.4 column 8) and as a function of country's religiosity when Gini index, per capita GNI, and GEI take on their mean values (see Table A.4 column 9). 95% confidence intervals are associated with each point estimate.

Figure 8: Average preferences for redistribution and estimated partial correlations of the female dummy with preferences for redistribution by age group, as a function of Gini index and per capita GNI



Panels (A) and (C) show the average male and female preferences for redistribution for each age group, as a function of Gini index and per capita GNI, respectively. Panels (B) and (D) show the estimated partial correlations of the female dummy with preferences for redistribution for each age group, as a function of Gini index and per capita GNI, respectively. 95% confidence intervals are associated with each point estimate.

Figure 9: Average preferences for redistribution and estimated partial correlations of the female dummy with preferences for redistribution by age group, as a function of GEI and country's religiosity



Panels (A) and (C) show the average male and female preferences for redistribution for each age group, as a function of GEI and country's religiosity, respectively. Panels (B) and (D) show the estimated partial correlations of the female dummy with preferences for redistribution for each age group, as a function of GEI and country's religiosity, respectively. 95% confidence intervals are associated with each point estimate.

Figure 10: Estimated partial correlations of the female dummy with preferences for redistribution: comparing welfare systems



We show the estimated coefficients of the female dummy and their confidence intervals for the for the six welfare systems, separately (see Table A.5).

Figure 11: Estimated partial correlations of the female dummy with preferences for redistribution: comparing welfare systems by age groups



We show the estimated partial correlations of the female dummy with preferences for redistribution for each age group for the six welfare systems, separately (see Table A.6). 95% confidence intervals are associated with each point estimate.

Figure 12: Estimated coefficients of the female dummy with preferences for redistribution: dynamics through time



We show the estimated coefficients of the female dummy and their confidence intervals for the five periods, separately (see Table A.7).

Figure 13: Estimated partial correlations of the female dummy with preferences for redistribution: dynamics through time by age groups



We show the estimated partial correlations of the female dummy with preferences for redistribution for each age group for the five periods, separately (see Table A.8). 95% confidence intervals are associated with each point estimate.

Appendix

A.1 Tables

Table A.1: Preferences for redistribution: individual characteristics and past experiences

Preferences for redistribution	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
	b/se	b/se	b/se	b/se	b/se
Female dummy	-0.017	0.119***	0.096***	0.085***	0.108***
	(0.014)	(0.016)	(0.011)	(0.010)	(0.010)
Age	0.013***	0.013***	0.012***	0.012***	0.012***
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Age squared	-0.000***	-0.000***	-0.000***	-0.000***	-0.000***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Household income	-0.042***	-0.042***	-0.035***	-0.035***	-0.035***
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)
Education - secondary	-0.041***	-0.041***	-0.034**	-0.034**	-0.034**
	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.013)
Education - tertiary	-0.198***	-0.199***	-0.197***	-0.197***	-0.198***
	(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.026)	(0.026)	(0.026)
Married	-0.022***	-0.022***	-0.010	-0.009	-0.009
	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.012)
Divorced	-0.015*	-0.016**	-0.013	-0.014	-0.013
	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.022)	(0.022)	(0.022)
Widowed	-0.078***	-0.077***	-0.048*	-0.046*	-0.047*
	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.026)	(0.026)	(0.026)
In Education	-0.038**	-0.039**	-0.064**	-0.064**	-0.064**
	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.027)	(0.027)	(0.027)
Unemployed	0.097***	0.098***	0.047***	0.048***	0.046***
	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.013)
Retired	0.073***	0.074***	0.068***	0.069***	0.068***
	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.014)
Housework	0.007	0.010	-0.014	-0.011	-0.013
	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.016)
Other activities	0.115***	0.115***	0.085***	0.085***	0.084***
	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.016)
Main Source of HH Income	-0.021***	-0.022***	-0.021***	-0.021***	-0.021***
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)
Political ideology	-0.093***	-0.081***	-0.071***	-0.071***	-0.071***
	(0.012)	(0.011)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)
Religiosity	0.002	0.003	-0.002	-0.002	-0.002
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)
Female d. * Pol. ideology	0.025***	.	.	.	.
	(0.003)	.	.	.	.
Female d. * Religiosity	.	-0.002	.	.	.
	.	(0.002)	.	.	.
Ever been divorced	.	.	-0.005	-0.037*	-0.005
	.	.	(0.014)	(0.020)	(0.014)
Unemployed last 12 months	.	.	0.055***	0.056***	0.069***
	.	.	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.009)
Female d. * Ever been divorced	.	.	.	0.060***	.
	.	.	.	(0.018)	.
Female d. * Unemployed last 12 months	.	.	.	.	-0.027**
	.	.	.	.	(0.013)
Interview-year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Country FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Obs.	299653	299653	70934	70934	70934
R-squared	0.144	0.144	0.115	0.115	0.115
PC Female dummy divorced last 12 months	.	.	.	0.142 .	
p-value	.	.	.	0.000	
PC Female dummy unemployed last 12 months	.	.	.	.	0.081
p-value	.	.	.	.	0.000

OLS estimates with the inclusion of interview-year and country- fixed effects. A constant is always included but unreported. The omitted reference dummy for education is primary, for legal marital status is single, while for occupational status is paid work. Figure 3 shows the estimated partial correlations of the female dummy with redistributive preferences referred to columns 1-2.

Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at country level. *** $p<0.01$, ** $p<0.05$, * $p<0.1$.

Table A.2: Preferences for redistribution: individual attitudes and beliefs

Preferences for redistribution	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
	b/se	b/se	b/se	b/se	b/se	b/se	b/se	b/se
Female dummy	0.093***	0.113***	0.110***	0.064***	0.110***	0.096***	0.106***	0.086***
	(0.010)	(0.027)	(0.011)	(0.018)	(0.011)	(0.012)	(0.011)	(0.014)
Age	0.012***	0.012***	0.012***	0.012***	0.012***	0.012***	0.011***	0.011***
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Age squared	-0.000***	-0.000***	-0.000***	-0.000***	-0.000***	-0.000***	-0.000***	-0.000***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Household income	-0.042***	-0.042***	-0.042***	-0.042***	-0.041***	-0.041***	-0.041***	-0.041***
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.003)
Education - secondary	-0.047***	-0.047***	-0.040***	-0.040***	-0.040***	-0.040***	-0.042***	-0.042***
	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.011)	(0.011)
Education - tertiary	-0.217***	-0.217***	-0.195***	-0.195***	-0.190***	-0.190***	-0.191***	-0.191***
	(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.020)	(0.020)
Married	-0.019**	-0.019**	-0.022***	-0.022***	-0.022***	-0.022***	-0.019**	-0.018**
	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)
Divorced	-0.017**	-0.017**	-0.017**	-0.016**	-0.019**	-0.019**	-0.020**	-0.020**
	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)
Widowed	-0.071***	-0.071***	-0.078***	-0.077***	-0.077***	-0.077***	-0.077***	-0.077***
	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.014)
In Education	-0.059***	-0.059***	-0.037**	-0.037**	-0.031*	-0.031*	-0.029*	-0.029*
	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.016)
Unemployed	0.096***	0.096***	0.096***	0.096***	0.093***	0.092***	0.087***	0.087***
	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.017)	(0.017)
Retired	0.073***	0.073***	0.073***	0.073***	0.074***	0.074***	0.073***	0.073***
	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.014)	(0.014)
Housework	0.008	0.009	0.009	0.010	0.008	0.008	0.007	0.007
	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.010)	(0.010)
Other activities	0.107***	0.107***	0.114***	0.114***	0.110***	0.110***	0.104***	0.104***
	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.012)	(0.012)
Main Source of HH Income	-0.022***	-0.022***	-0.022***	-0.022***	-0.022***	-0.022***	-0.023***	-0.023***
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)
Political ideology	-0.074***	-0.074***	-0.081***	-0.081***	-0.080***	-0.080***	-0.076***	-0.076***
	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)
Religiosity	-0.000	-0.000	0.002	0.002	0.004	0.004	0.005	0.005
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)
Importance equal treatment	0.132***	0.134***	.	.	.	.	.	.
	(0.004)	(0.005)	.	.	.	.	.	.
Female d. * Importance equal treat.	.	-0.004	.	.	.	.	.	.
	.	(0.005)	.	.	.	.	.	.
Fairness	.	.	-0.006**	-0.010***	.	.	.	.
	.	.	(0.003)	(0.003)	.	.	.	.
Female d. * Fairness	.	.	.	0.008***	.	.	.	.
	.	.	.	(0.003)	.	.	.	.
Trust in politicians	.	.	.	.	-0.021***	-0.023***	.	.
	.	.	.	.	(0.003)	(0.003)	.	.
Female d. * Trust in politicians	.	.	.	.	.	0.004	.	.
	.	.	.	.	.	(0.003)	.	.
Satisfaction national gov.	.	.	.	.	.	.	-0.034***	-0.037***
	.	.	.	.	.	.	(0.002)	(0.003)
Female d. * Satisfaction national gov.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	0.005**
	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	(0.002)
Interview-year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Country FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Obs.	292156	292156	298425	298425	297393	297393	295673	295673
R-squared	0.161	0.161	0.144	0.144	0.146	0.146	0.150	0.150

OLS estimates with the inclusion of interview-year and country- fixed effects. A constant is always included but unreported. The omitted reference dummy for education is primary, for legal marital status is single, while for occupational status is paid work. Figure 4 shows the estimated partial correlations of the female dummy with redistributive preferences referred to columns 2, 4, 6, and 8.

Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at country level. *** $p<0.01$, ** $p<0.05$, * $p<0.1$.

Table A.3: Preferences for redistribution: age, age groups, and generations

Preferences for redistribution	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	b/se	b/se	b/se	b/se	b/se	b/se
Female dummy	0.109***	0.048	0.110***	0.118***	0.110***	0.096***
	(0.011)	(0.032)	(0.011)	(0.017)	(0.011)	(0.019)
Age	0.013***	0.010***	0.011***	0.011***	0.015***	0.015***
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Age squared	-0.000***	-0.000***	-0.000***	-0.000***	-0.000***	-0.000***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Household income	-0.042***	-0.042***	-0.042***	-0.042***	-0.042***	-0.042***
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)
Education - secondary	-0.041***	-0.043***	-0.040***	-0.042***	-0.041***	-0.042***
	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.012)
Education - tertiary	-0.198***	-0.201***	-0.198***	-0.201***	-0.197***	-0.200***
	(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.021)
Married	-0.022***	-0.025***	-0.020**	-0.023***	-0.018**	-0.020***
	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)
Divorced	-0.016**	-0.017**	-0.013*	-0.015**	-0.012	-0.013*
	(0.008)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.008)	(0.008)
Widowed	-0.077***	-0.066***	-0.073***	-0.063***	-0.073***	-0.067***
	(0.014)	(0.013)	(0.014)	(0.013)	(0.014)	(0.014)
In Education	-0.039**	-0.041**	-0.043***	-0.045***	-0.044***	-0.045***
	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.016)	(0.016)
Unemployed	0.098***	0.097***	0.098***	0.096***	0.097***	0.096***
	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.018)
Retired	0.074***	0.068***	0.066***	0.061***	0.069***	0.066***
	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.015)	(0.015)
Housework	0.009	0.005	0.006	0.002	0.007	0.005
	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)
Other activities	0.115***	0.112***	0.113***	0.110***	0.113***	0.111***
	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.013)
Main Source of HH Income	-0.022***	-0.021***	-0.022***	-0.021***	-0.022***	-0.022***
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)
Political ideology	-0.081***	-0.081***	-0.081***	-0.081***	-0.081***	-0.081***
	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)
Religiosity	0.002	0.002	0.002	0.002	0.002	0.002
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)
Female d. * Age	.	0.005***	.	.	.	.
	.	(0.001)	.	.	.	.
Female d. * Age Sq	.	-0.000***	.	.	.	.
	.	(0.000)	.	.	.	.
Adult	.	.	0.021*	0.011	.	.
	.	.	(0.012)	(0.013)	.	.
Mature adult	.	.	0.072***	0.079***	.	.
	.	.	(0.015)	(0.016)	.	.
Elderly	.	.	0.104***	0.140***	.	.
	.	.	(0.018)	(0.021)	.	.
Female d. * Adult	.	.	.	0.021	.	.
	.	.	.	(0.013)	.	.
Female d. * Mature adult	.	.	.	-0.012	.	.
	.	.	.	(0.015)	.	.
Female d. * Elderly	.	.	.	-0.067***	.	.
	.	.	.	(0.016)	.	.
Millennials	.	.	.	.	0.009	0.002
	.	.	.	.	(0.017)	(0.019)
X Generation	.	.	.	.	-0.036*	-0.056**
	.	.	.	.	(0.019)	(0.022)
Boomers	.	.	.	.	-0.014	-0.019
	.	.	.	.	(0.020)	(0.020)
Silent Generation	.	.	.	.	0.004	0.021
	.	.	.	.	(0.015)	(0.018)
Female d. * Millennials	.	.	.	.	.	0.015
	.	.	.	.	.	(0.015)
Female d. * X Generation	.	.	.	.	.	0.042**
	.	.	.	.	.	(0.017)
Female d. * Boomers	.	.	.	.	.	0.013
	.	.	.	.	.	(0.016)
Female d. * Silent Generation	.	.	.	.	.	-0.031*
	.	.	.	.	.	(0.018)
Interview-year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Country FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Obs.	299653	299653	299653	299653	299653	299653
R-squared	0.144	0.144	0.144	0.144	0.144	0.144

OLS estimates with the inclusion of interview-year and country- fixed effects. A constant is always included but unreported. The omitted reference dummy for education is primary, for legal marital status is single, for occupational status is paid work, for age groups and generations are youth and Z Generation, respectively. Figure 5 shows the estimated partial correlations of the female dummy with redistributive preferences referred to columns 2, 4, and 6.

Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at country level. *** $p<0.01$, ** $p<0.05$, * $p<0.1$.

Table A.4: Preferences for redistribution: country-level variables

Preferences for redistribution	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
	b/se	b/se	b/se	b/se	b/se	b/se	b/se	b/se	b/se
Female dummy	0.114***	0.417***	0.111***	-0.020	0.111***	-0.309***	0.109***	0.209***	0.100
	(0.014)	(0.081)	(0.011)	(0.019)	(0.011)	(0.089)	(0.011)	(0.053)	(0.222)
Age	0.012***	0.012***	0.013***	0.013***	0.013***	0.013***	0.013***	0.013***	0.012***
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Age squared	-0.000***	-0.000***	-0.000***	-0.000***	-0.000***	-0.000***	-0.000***	-0.000***	-0.000***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Household income	-0.044***	-0.045***	-0.042***	-0.042***	-0.043***	-0.043***	-0.042***	-0.042***	-0.044***
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)
Education - secondary	-0.042***	-0.041***	-0.041***	-0.041***	-0.041***	-0.040***	-0.041***	-0.041***	-0.042***
	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.013)
Education - tertiary	-0.204***	-0.204***	-0.201***	-0.200***	-0.201***	-0.200***	-0.198***	-0.198***	-0.205***
	(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.022)
Married	-0.018**	-0.018**	-0.020**	-0.020**	-0.020**	-0.020***	-0.021***	-0.022***	-0.018**
	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.009)
Divorced	-0.020**	-0.020**	-0.016**	-0.016**	-0.016**	-0.016**	-0.016**	-0.016**	-0.020**
	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)
Widowed	-0.087***	-0.085***	-0.076***	-0.073***	-0.077***	-0.074***	-0.077***	-0.076***	-0.083***
	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.015)
In Education	-0.050**	-0.050**	-0.039**	-0.039**	-0.039**	-0.039**	-0.039**	-0.038**	-0.052**
	(0.019)	(0.019)	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.019)
Unemployed	0.113***	0.113***	0.106***	0.105***	0.107***	0.105***	0.098***	0.098***	0.113***
	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.019)
Retired	0.079***	0.079***	0.074***	0.076***	0.074***	0.076***	0.074***	0.074***	0.081***
	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.016)
Housework	0.024*	0.027**	0.009	0.010	0.009	0.014	0.009	0.013	0.028**
	(0.012)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.010)	(0.011)	(0.010)	(0.011)	(0.010)	(0.011)
Other activities	0.117***	0.116***	0.114***	0.113***	0.114***	0.113***	0.115***	0.115***	0.117***
	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.015)
Main Source of HH Income	-0.024***	-0.024***	-0.021***	-0.021***	-0.021***	-0.021***	-0.022***	-0.022***	-0.024***
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)
Political ideology	-0.091***	-0.091***	-0.082***	-0.082***	-0.082***	-0.082***	-0.081***	-0.081***	-0.091***
	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.012)
Religiosity	0.001	0.001	0.002	0.002	0.002	0.002	0.002	0.002	0.001
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)
Gini index	0.009	0.014*	.	.	.	.	.	.	0.014*
	(0.007)	(0.007)	.	.	.	.	.	.	(0.007)
Female d. * Gini index	.	-0.011***	.	.	.	.	.	.	-0.007***
	.	(0.003)	.	.	.	.	.	.	(0.002)
GNI pc	.	.	-0.000	-0.000	.	.	.	.	-0.000
	.	.	(0.000)	(0.000)	.	.	.	.	(0.000)
Female d. * GNI pc	.	.	.	0.000***	.	.	.	.	0.000
	.	.	.	(0.000)	.	.	.	.	(0.000)
Gender Equality Index	.	.	.	.	-0.385	-0.646	.	.	0.641
	.	.	.	.	(0.715)	(0.711)	.	.	(0.930)
Female d. * Gender Equality Index	.	.	.	.	.	0.475***	.	.	0.199
	.	.	.	.	.	(0.104)	.	.	(0.279)
Country's Religiosity	.	.	.	.	.	.	0.017	0.028	-0.036
	.	.	.	.	.	.	(0.065)	(0.065)	(0.066)
Female d. * Country's Religiosity	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	-0.022**	-0.005
	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	(0.010)	(0.011)
Interview-year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Country FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Obs.	223907	223907	295865	295865	295865	295865	299653	299653	222248
R-squared	0.151	0.152	0.146	0.146	0.146	0.146	0.144	0.144	0.153

OLS estimates with the inclusion of interview-year and country- fixed effects. A constant is always included but unreported. The omitted reference dummy for education is primary, for legal marital status is single, while for occupational status is paid work. Figure 6 shows the estimated partial correlations of the female dummy with redistributive preferences referred to columns 2, 4, and 9, while Figure 7 shows the estimated partial correlations of the female dummy with redistributive preferences referred to columns 6, 8, and 9.

Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at country level. *** $p<0.01$, ** $p<0.05$, * $p<0.1$.

Table A.5: Preferences for redistribution: comparing welfare systems

Preferences for redistribution	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	Social Democratic	Conservative	Liberal	Mediterranean	East Europe	Former USSR
	b/se	b/se	b/se	b/se	b/se	b/se
Female dummy	0.182***	0.112***	0.074***	0.058***	0.063***	0.080***
	(0.008)	(0.007)	(0.013)	(0.011)	(0.009)	(0.015)
Age	0.023***	0.009***	0.009***	0.005***	0.009***	0.008***
	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.003)
Age squared	-0.000***	-0.000***	-0.000***	-0.000**	-0.000***	-0.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Household income	-0.037***	-0.058***	-0.055***	-0.019***	-0.040***	-0.028***
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.003)
Education - secondary	-0.066***	-0.082***	-0.032**	-0.036***	-0.042***	0.008
	(0.011)	(0.009)	(0.015)	(0.013)	(0.010)	(0.019)
Education - tertiary	-0.213***	-0.277***	-0.126***	-0.102***	-0.334***	-0.158***
	(0.013)	(0.011)	(0.017)	(0.016)	(0.015)	(0.023)
Married	-0.032***	-0.004	-0.030*	-0.043***	0.008	0.005
	(0.012)	(0.010)	(0.017)	(0.015)	(0.013)	(0.022)
Divorced	-0.047***	-0.006	-0.033	-0.018	0.011	-0.019
	(0.016)	(0.014)	(0.023)	(0.023)	(0.018)	(0.028)
Widowed	-0.126***	-0.060***	-0.064**	-0.063***	-0.029	-0.077***
	(0.022)	(0.017)	(0.026)	(0.023)	(0.019)	(0.029)
In Education	-0.036*	-0.058***	-0.013	-0.056**	-0.087***	0.016
	(0.020)	(0.019)	(0.036)	(0.026)	(0.022)	(0.044)
Unemployed	0.104***	0.141***	0.041	0.063***	0.143***	0.074**
	(0.024)	(0.018)	(0.030)	(0.020)	(0.019)	(0.036)
Retired	0.121***	0.082***	-0.022	0.006	0.116***	0.051*
	(0.017)	(0.014)	(0.023)	(0.020)	(0.016)	(0.028)
Housework	0.018	0.041***	0.051**	0.002	0.036**	-0.042
	(0.024)	(0.014)	(0.022)	(0.019)	(0.018)	(0.039)
Other activities	0.149***	0.119***	0.097***	0.029	0.112***	0.048
	(0.024)	(0.019)	(0.031)	(0.032)	(0.027)	(0.039)
Main Source of HH Income	-0.026***	-0.024***	-0.023***	-0.008	-0.020***	-0.010
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.006)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.008)
Political ideology	-0.156***	-0.112***	-0.096***	-0.045***	-0.046***	-0.031***
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.003)
Religiosity	0.008***	-0.008***	0.010***	-0.003	0.012***	0.001
	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.003)
Interview-year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Country FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Obs.	53053	86476	27711	29700	55884	14739
R-squared	0.234	0.118	0.087	0.040	0.146	0.127

OLS estimates with the inclusion of interview-year and country- fixed effects. A constant is always included but unreported. The omitted reference dummy for education is primary, for legal marital status is single, while for occupational status is paid work. Figure 10 shows the estimated coefficients of the female dummy for the six welfare systems, separately.

Robust standard errors in parentheses (estimates with bootstrap standard errors available upon request). *** $p<0.01$, ** $p<0.05$, * $p<0.1$.

Table A.6: Preferences for redistribution: comparing welfare systems by age groups

Preferences for redistribution	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	Social Democratic	Conservative	Liberal	Mediterranean	East Europe	Former USSR
	b/se	b/se	b/se	b/se	b/se	b/se
Female dummy	0.183***	0.130***	0.061	0.145***	0.077***	-0.001
	(0.023)	(0.021)	(0.043)	(0.031)	(0.025)	(0.047)
Age	0.020***	0.009***	0.006*	0.008***	0.009***	0.009**
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.004)
Age squared	-0.000***	-0.000***	-0.000**	-0.000***	-0.000***	-0.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Household income	-0.037***	-0.058***	-0.055***	-0.019***	-0.040***	-0.027***
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.003)
Education - secondary	-0.066***	-0.084***	-0.032**	-0.038***	-0.044***	0.004
	(0.011)	(0.009)	(0.015)	(0.013)	(0.010)	(0.019)
Education - tertiary	-0.215***	-0.279***	-0.126***	-0.107***	-0.339***	-0.159***
	(0.013)	(0.011)	(0.017)	(0.016)	(0.015)	(0.023)
Married	-0.032***	-0.003	-0.028*	-0.046***	0.004	0.009
	(0.012)	(0.010)	(0.017)	(0.015)	(0.013)	(0.023)
Divorced	-0.045***	-0.005	-0.032	-0.017	0.008	-0.015
	(0.016)	(0.014)	(0.023)	(0.023)	(0.018)	(0.028)
Widowed	-0.100***	-0.044**	-0.050*	-0.069***	-0.017	-0.064**
	(0.023)	(0.017)	(0.026)	(0.024)	(0.019)	(0.029)
In Education	-0.042**	-0.069***	-0.020	-0.032	-0.095***	-0.048
	(0.021)	(0.020)	(0.038)	(0.029)	(0.024)	(0.049)
Unemployed	0.101***	0.138***	0.042	0.069***	0.139***	0.066*
	(0.024)	(0.018)	(0.030)	(0.020)	(0.019)	(0.036)
Retired	0.102***	0.064***	-0.030	-0.003	0.109***	0.055*
	(0.019)	(0.015)	(0.024)	(0.021)	(0.016)	(0.029)
Housework	0.008	0.035***	0.047**	0.006	0.026	-0.044
	(0.024)	(0.014)	(0.022)	(0.019)	(0.018)	(0.039)
Other activities	0.143***	0.113***	0.093***	0.037	0.105***	0.035
	(0.024)	(0.019)	(0.031)	(0.032)	(0.027)	(0.039)
Main Source of HH Income	-0.026***	-0.025***	-0.023***	-0.009*	-0.020***	-0.008
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.006)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.008)
Political ideology	-0.155***	-0.112***	-0.096***	-0.045***	-0.046***	-0.030***
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.003)
Religiosity	0.008***	-0.007***	0.010***	-0.003	0.012***	0.002
	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.003)
Adult	0.029	0.012	0.010	0.077**	-0.015	-0.151***
	(0.027)	(0.024)	(0.044)	(0.034)	(0.029)	(0.054)
Mature adult	0.129***	0.073**	0.091	0.045	0.051	-0.088
	(0.036)	(0.031)	(0.057)	(0.045)	(0.038)	(0.070)
Elderly	0.232***	0.157***	0.132**	0.099*	0.080*	-0.041
	(0.044)	(0.038)	(0.065)	(0.053)	(0.045)	(0.080)
Female d. * Adult	0.035	-0.003	0.040	-0.103***	0.039	0.113**
	(0.026)	(0.024)	(0.047)	(0.035)	(0.028)	(0.053)
Female d. * Mature adult	0.001	-0.005	0.015	-0.107***	-0.045	0.115**
	(0.028)	(0.025)	(0.049)	(0.037)	(0.029)	(0.054)
Female d. * Elderly	-0.080***	-0.078***	-0.036	-0.076**	-0.079***	0.024
	(0.030)	(0.026)	(0.049)	(0.038)	(0.030)	(0.054)
Interview-year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Country FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Obs.	53052	86476	27711	29700	55884	14739
R-squared	0.235	0.118	0.088	0.041	0.146	0.129

OLS estimates with the inclusion of interview-year and country- fixed effects. A constant is always included but unreported. The omitted reference dummy for education is primary, for legal marital status is single, for occupational status is paid work, while for age groups are youth. Figure 11 shows the estimated partial correlations of the female dummy with redistributive preferences for each age group for the six welfare systems, separately.

Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** $p<0.01$, ** $p<0.05$, * $p<0.1$.

Table A.7: Preferences for redistribution: dynamics through time

Preferences for redistribution	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
	Rounds 1-2 2002-2005	Rounds 3-4 2006-2009	Rounds 5-6 2010-2013	Rounds 7-8 2014-2017	Rounds 9-10 2018-2022
	b/se	b/se	b/se	b/se	b/se
Female dummy	0.131***	0.125***	0.101***	0.097***	0.092***
	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.012)
Age	0.014***	0.014***	0.011***	0.012***	0.010***
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.002)
Age squared	-0.000***	-0.000***	-0.000***	-0.000***	-0.000***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Household income	-0.055***	-0.046***	-0.047***	-0.046***	-0.042***
	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.005)	(0.004)	(0.003)
Education - secondary	-0.043*	-0.040**	-0.027	-0.027	-0.036**
	(0.022)	(0.016)	(0.019)	(0.018)	(0.015)
Education - tertiary	-0.254***	-0.238***	-0.187***	-0.153***	-0.125***
	(0.030)	(0.028)	(0.023)	(0.032)	(0.026)
Married	-0.039**	-0.017	0.012	-0.007	-0.036***
	(0.014)	(0.017)	(0.015)	(0.014)	(0.012)
Divorced	0.006	-0.006	0.002	-0.035*	-0.034**
	(0.017)	(0.015)	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.013)
Widowed	-0.082***	-0.050*	-0.067***	-0.096***	-0.099***
	(0.026)	(0.027)	(0.017)	(0.022)	(0.020)
In Education	-0.036	-0.041	-0.015	-0.046*	-0.057**
	(0.033)	(0.032)	(0.022)	(0.025)	(0.021)
Unemployed	0.148***	0.124***	0.067***	0.121***	0.045
	(0.042)	(0.033)	(0.023)	(0.019)	(0.031)
Retired	0.086***	0.056***	0.080***	0.066***	0.053**
	(0.026)	(0.020)	(0.020)	(0.021)	(0.023)
Housework	0.006	-0.001	0.009	0.021	-0.022
	(0.018)	(0.013)	(0.024)	(0.027)	(0.018)
Other activities	0.127***	0.151***	0.107***	0.102***	0.087***
	(0.027)	(0.024)	(0.022)	(0.029)	(0.021)
Main Source of HH Income	-0.019***	-0.017***	-0.032***	-0.030***	-0.013*
	(0.006)	(0.005)	(0.006)	(0.005)	(0.007)
Political ideology	-0.083***	-0.083***	-0.073***	-0.086***	-0.079***
	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.011)	(0.012)	(0.012)
Religiosity	0.008	0.001	0.001	-0.001	0.003
	(0.005)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.003)
Interview-year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Country FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Obs.	52350	59775	68231	59701	59596
R-squared	0.166	0.149	0.161	0.141	0.128

OLS estimates with the inclusion of interview-year and country- fixed effects. A constant is always included but unreported. The omitted reference dummy for education is primary, for legal marital status is single, while for occupational status is paid work. Figure 12 shows the estimated coefficients of the female dummy for the five periods, separately.

Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at country level. *** $p<0.01$, ** $p<0.05$, * $p<0.1$.

Table A.8: Preferences for redistribution: dynamics through time by age groups

Preferences for redistribution	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
	Rounds 1-2 2002-2005	Rounds 3-4 2006-2009	Rounds 5-6 2010-2013	Rounds 7-8 2014-2017	Rounds 9-10 2018-2022
	b/se	b/se	b/se	b/se	b/se
Female dummy	0.126***	0.106***	0.099***	0.119***	0.140***
	(0.021)	(0.032)	(0.022)	(0.025)	(0.037)
Age	0.015***	0.016***	0.007***	0.009***	0.009***
	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Age squared	-0.000***	-0.000***	-0.000***	-0.000***	-0.000***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Household income	-0.055***	-0.046***	-0.047***	-0.046***	-0.042***
	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.005)	(0.004)	(0.003)
Education - secondary	-0.043*	-0.041**	-0.027	-0.028	-0.037**
	(0.022)	(0.017)	(0.019)	(0.018)	(0.015)
Education - tertiary	-0.256***	-0.239***	-0.188***	-0.156***	-0.131***
	(0.030)	(0.028)	(0.023)	(0.032)	(0.027)
Married	-0.040**	-0.014	0.013	-0.007	-0.039***
	(0.015)	(0.016)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.012)
Divorced	0.004	-0.003	0.003	-0.034*	-0.033**
	(0.018)	(0.015)	(0.017)	(0.018)	(0.013)
Widowed	-0.077***	-0.025	-0.052***	-0.081***	-0.088***
	(0.026)	(0.026)	(0.017)	(0.023)	(0.020)
In Education	-0.036	-0.062*	-0.030	-0.048**	-0.047**
	(0.031)	(0.031)	(0.025)	(0.023)	(0.021)
Unemployed	0.147***	0.120***	0.064***	0.120***	0.045
	(0.042)	(0.033)	(0.023)	(0.019)	(0.031)
Retired	0.081***	0.032	0.072***	0.054**	0.034
	(0.027)	(0.021)	(0.020)	(0.024)	(0.023)
Housework	0.003	-0.011	0.002	0.015	-0.029
	(0.019)	(0.013)	(0.024)	(0.026)	(0.018)
Other activities	0.125***	0.140***	0.098***	0.098***	0.086***
	(0.026)	(0.023)	(0.022)	(0.029)	(0.021)
Main Source of HH Income	-0.019***	-0.018***	-0.031***	-0.030***	-0.014*
	(0.006)	(0.005)	(0.006)	(0.005)	(0.007)
Political ideology	-0.083***	-0.082***	-0.073***	-0.086***	-0.079***
	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.011)	(0.012)	(0.012)
Religiosity	0.008	0.001	0.001	-0.001	0.003
	(0.005)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.003)
Adult	-0.013	-0.054*	0.015	0.039	0.060*
	(0.032)	(0.029)	(0.024)	(0.030)	(0.032)
Mature adult	0.008	0.042	0.115***	0.093**	0.109***
	(0.040)	(0.045)	(0.028)	(0.039)	(0.033)
Elderly	0.025	0.153***	0.147***	0.160***	0.187***
	(0.047)	(0.055)	(0.038)	(0.044)	(0.042)
Female d. * Adult	0.025	0.059**	0.030	-0.003	-0.019
	(0.025)	(0.026)	(0.022)	(0.022)	(0.039)
Female d. * Mature adult	-0.014	0.015	-0.000	-0.010	-0.055
	(0.026)	(0.032)	(0.021)	(0.027)	(0.035)
Female d. * Elderly	-0.018	-0.062*	-0.048*	-0.082***	-0.103**
	(0.026)	(0.034)	(0.024)	(0.027)	(0.039)
Interview-year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Country FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Obs.	52350	59775	68231	59702	59596
R-squared	0.167	0.150	0.162	0.141	0.129

OLS estimates with the inclusion of interview-year and country-fixed effects. A constant is always included but unreported. The omitted reference dummy for education is primary, for legal marital status is single, for occupational status is paid work, while for age groups is youth. Figure 13 shows the estimated partial correlations of the female dummy with redistributive preferences for each age group for the five periods, separately.

Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at country level. *** $p<0.01$, ** $p<0.05$, * $p<0.1$.

A.2 Description of variables

Data on individual attitudes are taken from the European Social Survey (ESS) (`https://www.europeansocialsurv` `org/data/`). Data are for 39 European countries for the period 2002-2022. The countries in our sample are the following ones: Albania, Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Kosovo, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Macedonia, Montenegro, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russia, Serbia, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, Ukraine, and United Kingdom.

`Female dummy`. It equals 1 for female respondents and 0 for male respondents.

`Age` and `age-squared`. Respondent's age and respondent's age squared. The original variable is called *agea*.

`Household income`. Different increasing classes of household's total net income, summing up all income sources: from less than 1800 to 120000 or more per year. The original variable is called *hinctnt*.

`Education`. Different increasing levels of respondent's education: from "Less than lower secondary education" to "Tertiary education completed". The original variable is called *edulvla*. In some waves, both the name and the ranking of the variable change. Thus, we homogenize them to those of the reference variable *edulvla*. For the analysis, we construct a set of indicator variables as follows: primary, secondary, and tertiary. Secondary and tertiary are the categories included in the estimated regressions.

`Legal marital Status`. We construct a set of 4 dummy variables based on the original variable called *marital*: Single, Married, Divorced, and Widowed. Since in some waves, both the name and the ranking of the variable change, we homogenize them to those of the reference variable *marital*.
`Married`. We construct a dummy variable based on the original variable called *marital*. It equals 1 for married respondents and 0 otherwise. Since in some waves, both the name and the ranking of the variable change, we homogenize them to those of the reference variable *marital*.

`Occupational Status`. We construct a set of 6 dummy variables based on the original variable called *mnactic*: paid work, in education, unemployed, retired, housework, other activities.

`Main source of household income`. We employ a categorical variable on household's primary income source, ranging from 1 to 7, and capturing salary and wages, self-employment, pension, unemployment benefits, social benefits, investment, and other sources, respectively. The original variable

is called *hincsrc*. In some waves, both the name and the ranking of the variable change. Thus, we recode and homogenize them to those of the reference variable *hincsrc*.

`Political ideology`. The original variable is called "Placement on left-right scale" (*lrscale*). It goes from 0 (Left) to 10 (Right).

`Religiosity`. It is the answer to the following question: "How religious are you?". The original variable is called *rlgdgr* and takes on values from 0 (Not at all religious) to 10 (Very religious).

`Ever been divorced`. We recoded the original variable *dvrcdev*. It equals 1 for divorced respondents and 0 otherwise.

`Unemployed last 12 months`. It is the answer to the following question: "Any period of unemployment and work seeking lasted 12 months or more". The original variable is called *uemp12m*. It equals 1 for respondents that answer *yes* and 0 otherwise.

`Importance equal treatment`. It is the answer to the following question: "Important that people are treated equally and have equal opportunities". The original variable is called *ipeqopt*. We reverse the scale such that it takes on values from 1 (Not like me at all) to 6 (Very much like me).

`Fairness`. It is the answer to the following question: "Do you think that most people would try to take advantage of you if they got the chance, or would they try to be fair?". The original variable is called *pplfair* and takes on values from 0 (Most people would try to take advantage of me) to 10 (Most people would try to be fair).

`Trust in politicians`. It is the answer to the following question: "How much you personally trust politicians?". The original variable is called *trstplt* and takes on values from 0 (No trust at all) to 10 (Complete trust).

`Satisfaction with national government`. It is the answer to the following question: "How satisfied are you with the way the national government is doing its job?". The original variable is called *stfgov* and takes on values from 0 (Extremely dissatisfied) to 10 (Extremely satisfied).

`Age groups`. We construct four indicators for four age groups based on the age of the respondent, as follows: Youth for respondents aged 25 or less; Adult for respondents aged between 26 and 50; Mature adult for respondents aged between 51 and 65; Elderly for respondents aged 65 or more.

`Generations`. We construct five indicators for five generations based on the year of birth of the respondent, as follows: Generation Z for respondents born between 1997 and 2012; Millenials for respondents born between 1981 and 1996; Generation X for respondents born between 1965 and 1980; Boomers for respondents born between 1946 and 1964; Silent generation for respondents born between

1928 and 1945.

`GINI index`. Gini coefficient of equalized disposable income from ESS Data Portal, ESS Multilevel Data. It is a country level variable available from 2002 to 2020. Data on Gini referred to 2020 are imputed also to 2021 and 2022 interview year.

`GNI pc`. Per capita gross national income, in thousand dollars (2017 PPP$), from UNDP - All composite index and components time series (1990-2021), `https://hdr.undp.org/data-center/documentation-and-downloads`.

`Gender equality index`. It is constructed from the UNDP Gender inequality index and retrieved from UNDP - All composite index and components time series (1990-2021), `https://hdr.undp.org/data-center/documentation-and-downloads`. We reverse the index such that the higher the index, the higher the level of gender equality.

`Country's Religiosity`. We construct an aggregate measure of country's religiosity as the average score to the question: "How religious are you?" (*rlgdgr*). The higher the score, the higher the average religiosity in the country. It is computed for each participating country in each ESS round.

`Welfare systems`. We construct six indicators according to the prevailing welfare system in each country, as follows: Social democratic – Denmark, Finland, Norway, and Sweden; Conservative – Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Switzerland; Liberal – Ireland and United Kingdom; Mediterranean – Greece, Italy, Portugal, and Spain; East Europe – Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania, Slovak Republic, and Slovenia; Former USSR – Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. Sources: Esping-Andersen 1990, Ferrera 1996, Fenger 2007, Kudrnáč and Petrúšek 2022. According to these sources, a number of countries could not be included in any of the above categories.