Seminario DONDENA - Jutta Bolt

Did Western colonial rule transform African political institutions? Despite extensive research on indirect rule, we have little systematic evidence about how colonizers’ aims interacted with the structure of indigenous institutions to shape local governance. We explain why colonizers faced incentives to delegate authority to traditionally legitimate institutions, even in historically decentralized areas. Empirically, we analyze originally compiled data on African political institutions in the precolonial and colonial periods for more than 450 subnational units across British Africa. We focus on councils as a form of executive constraints. Subnational councils were widespread, exhibited strong correlations with precolonial institutions and patterns of socioeconomic development, and exerted meaningful decision-making powers. These indirect-rule institutions reflected reforms to replace ineffective installed agents. Pressure from below prompted British officials to reintroduce systems of executive constraintsbased on precolonial models. Our findings reject widespread claims that colonizers could unilaterally implement indirect-rule institutions while disregarding precolonial precedents.